Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Citizen Suits:
Should the Supreme Court Extend Gwaltney? by Keithline, Jeffrey A.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 3 Article 12
Summer 6-1-1997
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Citizen Suits: Should the Supreme Court
Extend Gwaltney?
Jeffrey A. Keithline
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey A. Keithline, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Citizen Suits: Should the
Supreme Court Extend Gwaltney?, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1227 (1997),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol54/iss3/12
Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Citizen Suits:
Should the Supreme Court Extend Gwaltney?
Jeffrey A. Keithline"
[Those pursuing citizen lawsuits] are not to be treated as nuisances
or troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants in the vmdi-
cation of environmental interests.
- Friends of the Earth v. Carey'
L Introduction
In 1984, a methyl cyanide release at the Umon Carbide pesticide facility
in Bhopal, India killed at least two thousand people and injured countless
others.2 A few months later, an accident at another Umon Carbide factory
in West Virginia caused over one hundred injunes.3 Umon Carbide's
* I would like to thank Professor David A. Wirth, Marci Paduda, Krista Bowen,
Kathleen Flynn, and Christopher W Meyer for their invaluable editorial assistance. I would
also like to acknowledge my parents, Herschel and Carol Keithline, who were always willing
to drop everything and drive halfway across the country to help take care of Nathan when
things got crazy. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Kimberly, for her patience, support, and
encouragement throughout everything that we accomplish together.
1. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976), quoted in Charles
N. Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or the Agony
of Defeat?, 15 WM. MITCHELLL. REv 327, 329 (1989).
2. See Pico Iyer, India's Night of Death: More than 2,500 People Are Killed in the
Worst Industrial Disaster Ever, TIME, Dec. 17, 1984, at 22, 22-31 (reporting details of Bhopal
disaster); see also JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAw" LESSONS FROM
BHOPAL 5-6 (1993) (describing Bhopal disaster as worst industrial catastrophe in history
except perhaps Chernobyl nuclear explosion); DAN KJRzMAN, A KILLING WIND: INSIDE
UNION CARBIDE AND THE BHOPAL CATASTROPHE ix (1987) (estimating disaster killed eight
thousand people and injured nearly 300,000 people). Cassels notes that the long-term effects
on the people of Bhopal included respiratory disorders, blindness, gynecological illnesses, and
a high infant mortality rate. CASSELS, supra, at 5-6; see also Citizens for a Better Env't v
Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing Union Carbide disaster), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
3. See More Woe for Umon Carbide, TIME, Mar. 25, 1985, at 45, 45 (noting over 60
smaller leaks at Union Carbide factory in Institute, West Virgima); Under a Noxious Cloud
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emergency response planning and prevention measures were inadequate to
address these incidents.4 Largely m response to these disasters, Congress
passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act
(EPCRA) as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986.' EPCRA's purpose is to provide the public with important informa-
tion on hazardous chemicals manufactured, used, stored, or handled m its
communities. 6 EPCRA requires the gathering and dissemination of informa-
of Fear: A Toxic Gas Leak Rocks "Chemical Valley" Residents, TIME, Aug. 26, 1985, at 13,
13 (reporting leak at Union Carbide factory in West Virguua); see also KURzMAN, supra note
2, at 205-07 (discussing Union Carbide accident m Institute, West Virginia). Only a few
months before the accident, Union Carbide assured West Virgnians that a Bhopal-like leak
"could not happen" in West Virginia. Id. at 205; see also Sidney M. Wolf, Fear andLoathng
About the Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 218 (1996) (noting West
Virginia facility accident's contribution to enactment of Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)).
4. See CASSELS, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that response to Bhopal accident was
disorganized and disappointing); Wolf, supra note 3, at 218 (noting that Union Carbide was
not prepared for accidents).
5. Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994)) [hereinafter EPCRA].
Congress intended EPCRA to be a free standing law even though Congress included EPCRA
in the 1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). See Wolf, supra note 3, at 218-19 (discussing passage of
EPCRA); see also Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1238 (stating that Congress passed
EPCRA in response to Union Carbide disaster as well as other smaller incidents to improve
emergency response capabilities and provide information to communities); CASSELS, supra
note 2, at 68 (noting emergence of "right to know" principle after Bhopal); Paul E. Hagen,
Update on the Emergency Plannmg and Community Right-To-Know Act, HAZARDOUS
WASTES, SUPEFD, AND Toxic SumSTANCES, SB25 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 73, 77 (Oct. 24, 1996)
(discussing Bhopal disaster as catalyst for passage of EPCRA). But see KuRzMAN, supra note
2, at 206 (explaining reasons, including economic self-interest, why citizens did not demand
broader rights to information regarding chemicals stored in their communities); Robert W
Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits and the Sixth Circuit's Assault of the Public's Right to
Know, ALB. L. ENvTL. OUTLOOK, Fall 1995, at 29, 29 (noting that enactment of EPCRA
occurred in wake of more than 7,000 chemical accidents in five years preceding its passage).
6. See H.R. REP No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 59, 110-11 (1985) (stating program provides
citizens expanded information concerning hazards of chemical material in their communities),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 2835, 2841, 2892-93. House Report 253 accompanied House
Bill 2817 H.R. 2817, 99th Cong. (1986). Congress passed House Bill 2005 in lieu of House
Bill 2817; House Bill 2005 contained much of the text of the original bill. See H.R. REP No.
99-253, pt. 1, at 1 (1985) (discussing development of EPCRA), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2835. The citizen suit provision emerged from Senate Bill 51. S. 51,
99th Cong. § 138 (1985); see H.R. CONF REP. No. 99-962, at 309 (1986) (noting that House




tion regarding the hazardous and toxic chemicals that industrial facilities
possess or release.7 Like most environmental statutes, EPCRA contains a
citizen suit provision.8 Although most environmental citizen enforcement
provisions follow the model from the Clean Air Act, Congress departed from
tlus model when it drafted EPCRA's citizen suit provision.9 This departure
7 EPCRA §§ 300-330,42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050(1994); see also 3 FRANK P GRAD,
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4C.01, at 4C-2 to -3 (1997) (describing background
and purposes of EPCRA); Wolf, supra note 3, at 220 (discussing major functions of EPCRA).
8. EPCRA § 326(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1). The citizen suit provision of EPCRA
provides:
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, any person may com-
mence a civil action on his own behalf against the following:
(A) An owner or operator of a facilityforfailure to do any of the follow-
ing:
(i) Submit a followup emergency notice under section 11004(c) of
this title.
(ii) Submit a material safety data sheet or a list under section
11021(a) of this title.
(iii) Complete and submit an inventory form under section 11022(a)
of this title containing tier I information as described m section
11022(d)(1) of this title unless such requirement does not apply by reason
of the second sentence of section 11022(a)(2) of this title.
(iv) Complete and submit a toxic chemical release form under section
11023(a) of this title.
(B) The Administrator for failure to do any of the following:
(i) Publish inventory forms under section 11022(g) of this title.
(C) The Administrator, a State Governor, or a State emergency response
commission, for failure to provide a mechanism for public availability of
information in accordance with section 11044(a) of this title.
(D) A State Governor or a State emergency response commission for
failure to respond to a request for tier II information under section
11022(e)(3) of this title within 120 days after the date of receipt of the
request.
Id. (emphasis added); see Wolf, supra note 3, at 277-78 (noting that industry feared EPCRA's
citizen suit provision and was concerned that citizens could use information obtained under
EPCRA to aid toxic tort litigation). Professor Wolf notes that citizens have brought only a
modest number of citizen suits under EPCRA. Id.
9. See S. REP. No. 99-11, at 62 (1985) (stating that Congress modeled EPCRA's
citizen suit provision after similar provisions in Clean Air, Clean Water, and Solid Waste
Disposal Acts); JEFFREY G. MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., CrrIZEN Surfs: PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAws § 2.1, at 6 (1987) (stating that
Congress has tendency to lift citizen suit provision from Clean Air Act and to make only
minor changes when enacting new environmental legislation). But see Benedict S. Cohen &
Dirk D. Haire, Environmental Citizen Suits: Standing and the Proper Scope of Relief, in
CrIZEN SuITs AND Qui TAM ACTONS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBUc POUCY 21, 49-50
(Roger Clegg & James L.J. Nuzzo eds., 1996) (noting difference in language in citizen suit
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requires careful consideration to determine whether courts should extend the
legislative history and court decisions under the model provision to EPCRA.
Two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have disagreed over the
interpretation of EPCRA's citizen suit provision."0 Under EPCRA, a plain-
tiff cannot commence a citizen suit until sixty days after the plaintiff gives
notice of an alleged violation to the state office responsible for environmental
enforcement, to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and to the
alleged violator." However, the circuit courts have disagreed on what
happens to a citizen's cause of action if the alleged violator cures its noncom-
pliance after receipt of notice and before the plaintiff files suit. In Atlantic
States Legal Foundation v United Musical Instruments, Inc. ,"2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that the court lacked
jurisdiction because EPCRA does not authorize citizen suits for purely
historical violations of the Act. 3 In Citizens for a Better Environment v
Steel Co.,14 a factually similar case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and stated that EPCRA
authorized citizen suits for wholly past violations.' 5
In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,6 the
Supreme Court considered the same issue under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (Clean Water Act) 7 citizen suit provision.' After close analysis
provision in EPCRA from that m Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act).
10. See Hagen, supra note 5, at 120 (noting split between Sixth and Seventh Circuits
over interpretation of EPCRA citizen suit provision).
11. See EPCRA § 326(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d)(1) (requiring citizen to provide
notice before filing cause of action to enforce EPCRA).
12. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995).
13. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, Inc., 61 F.3d 473,
478 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that EPCRA precluded citizen suits for purely historical
violations of Act); infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text (discussing United Musical
Instruments).
14. 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
15. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that citizens can sue under EPCRA even after violators submit overdue filings
and comply with EPCRA), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997); infra notes 138-58 and
accompanying text (discussing Citizens for a Better Env't).
16. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
17 Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). The citizen suit provision of the
Clean Water Act provides in part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section , any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
1230
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of the statute's language, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs could
not commence citizen suits against polluters for wholly past violations of the
Clean Water Act. '9 Although both the Sixth and Seventh Circuit courts
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of
(A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in contro-
versy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or
duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section
1319(d) of this title.
Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (emphasis added).
18. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64
(1987) (concluding that citizen suit provision of Clean Water Act did not confer federal
jurisdiction over citizen suits for "wholly past violations"). In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court
considered the extent of the citizen suit provision in the Clean Water Act. Id. at 52. The
citizen suit provision allowed citizens to recover civil penalties and legal fees against alleged
violators of the Act. Id. at 53. Between 1981 and 1984, Gwaltney repeatedly violated the
conditions of a discharge permit. Id. In accordance with the Clean Water Act citizen suit
provision, two nonprofit environmental organizations sent a notice of intent to sue to
Gwaltney, the EPA, and the appropriate state agency. Id. at 54. After the notice period had
run, the two organizations filed suit. Id. Gwaltney moved to dismiss the suit because its last
recorded violation occurred several weeks before the plaintiffs filed the complaint. Id. at 55.
The district court rejected Gwaltney's argument and found that it could reasonably read the
citizen suit provision as allowing suits for unlawful conduct "that occurred solely prior to the
filing of the lawsuit." Id. Rejecting the Fifth Circuit's interpretation which barred citizen
suits for wholly past violations, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. Id.
at 56 (discussing Hanker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985)).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split. Id. The Court stated that
the "most natural reading" of the citizen suit provision required citizen plaintiffs to allege
continuous or intermittent Clean Water Act violations. Id. at 57 Reviewing the language and
legislative history of the Act, the Court concluded that the purpose of the notice period was
to allow the EPA or the state to bring enforcement actions as well as to provide the alleged
violator an opportunity to bring itself into compliance. Id. at 59-60. The Gwaltney Court
stated that allowing suits for past violations would render the notice provision incomprehensi-
ble. Id. at 59. Relying on its reading of the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision, the Court
found that the Act did not authorize a citizen suit based solely on historical violations. Id. at
64. However, the Court stated that the district court found that the citizen-plaintiff had alleged
a continuing violation in good faith. Id. at 64. The Court remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion because it agreed that the citizen suit provision confers jurisdiction "when the citi-
zen-plaintiffs make a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation "Id.
at 64; see infra notes 80-112 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney).
19. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
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purported to base their decision on an extension of the Supreme Court's
analysis m Gwaltney, the mconsistent holdings of these two courts demon-
strate the uncertain application of Gwaltney to EPCRA citizen suits. The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari m the Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment case to resolve the split in the circuits .'
This Note reviews the recent decisions m Atlantic States Legal Founda-
tion v United Musical Instruments, Inc. and Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment v Steel Co. and explores the courts' reasoning m an effort to determine
the best approach to tis problem. Part II describes the legislative history
and development of citizen enforcement in environmental legislation. Part
Im analyzes the Gwaltney decision, wich precluded citizen suits for purely
historical violations, and the two circuit court opinions that addressed tis
issue with regard to the EPCRA citizen suit provision. Part IV analyzes the
plain language of EPCRA's citizen suit provision and discusses other con-
cerns with citizen suits. This Note concludes by recommending an amend-
ment to citizen suit provisions that would allow plaintiffs to recover expenses
associated with bringing violators into compliance.
HI. A Brief History of the Citizen Suit in Environmental Statutes
Private law enforcement is not unique to the modem environmental
arena.21 Stockholder derivative suits, class actions, and public nuisance
claims are examples of private enforcement in other areas of the law 2
Although citizens historically used courts to protect private property from
each other and from the government, private citizens had no cause of action
to protect shared public resources until 1970.' After the Supreme Court
recognized harm to the environment as sufficiently serious to provide stand-
ing for citizens to sue, private enforcement of environmental legislation
20. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
21. See MICHAEL D. AxLIm, ENviRONMmENTAL CIzEN Surrs § 1.02, at 1-2 to -5
(1995) (tracing origin of citizen suit to English common law and Norman conquest); Barry
Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of
Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BuFF L. REv 833, 946-47 (1985)
(tracing citizen enforcement to Richard II and English Parliament as evidenced by their 1388
passage of water pollution statute that provided for public as well as private enforcement).
22. See MiLLER & ENvIRONMEAL. LAw INsT., supra note 9, § 1.0, at 1 (describing
endorsement of private enforcement in federal statutes); Cass R. Sunstem, What's Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article HI, 91 MICH. L. REv 163, 173-75
(1992) (suggesting that private action to enforce public interest is historic feature of American
and English legal systems).




blossomed.24 This Part traces the development and purpose of the citizen
suit provision m environmental legislation.
Modem environmental law originated m the 1960s as part of the activist
movement.Y Environmental fervor gathered steam m the late 1960s and
exploded m the early 1970s.' The large gathering of people at the first
Earth Day on April 22, 1970 demonstrated the swell of support for the
environmentY As concern for the environment grew, awareness of the lack
of effective state and federal enforcement programs also mcreased.' During
the 1970s, often called the "environmental decade," Congress attempted to
address the issue of ineffective enforcement of environmental statutes.
29
Environmental scholars proposed increased citizen participation as one
solution to the enforcement problem,' and Congress responded by including
24. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (recognmmg that aesthetic and
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, can be basis for standing under Admins-
trative Procedure Act). Although protection of shared resources can be the basis for standing,
the Court found plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they were "injured in fact" and dismissed
their suit. Id. at 739-41; see also AXLINE, supra note 21, § 1.02, at 1-8 to -9 (discussing
importance of Sierra Club m development of citizen suit).
25. See 1 GRAD, supra note 7, § 1.01, at 1-3 to -8 (describing development of modem
environmental law). Before the 1960s, the country was not concerned with the environmental
impact of industrial growth because it was too busy fighting and recovering from World War
II. Id. at 1-3. Several environmental disasters in the 1960s caused increased awareness of
humanity's effect on the environment. Id.
26. See David Sive, Environmental Standing, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at
49, 51 (describing early environmental movement). Mr. Sive states that public interest and
debate over the environment resulted in many events, including enactment of the Clean Air
Act, creation of the Environmental Law Institute, and President Nixon's creation of the EPA.
Id.
27 See Jeanne McDowell, Let Earth Have Its Day: But the Biggest Demonstration in
History Should Be Only the Beginning, TIME, Dec. 18, 1989, at 71, 71 (discussing historical
gathering of over 20 million people which awakened public to unportance of preserving
environment).
28. See 1 GRAD, supra note 7, § 2.03[19][a], at 2-474 (noting lement and inadequate
enforcement m 1960s and 1970s era).
29. See MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INsT., supra note 9, § 2.1, at 3-4 (1987)
(discussing early attempt to overcome cumbersome mechanisms of early environmental
statutes).
30. See Sive, supra note 26, at 51 (discussing development of citizen suit provisions).
A group of scholars suggested that citizen suits were an important vehicle m enforcement of
environmental laws. Id. This group included Professor Frank Grad of Columbia Law School,
author of a leading treatise on environmental law, and Professor Joseph Sax of Michigan Law
School, drafter of the Michigan environmental citizen suit provision. Id. This group helped
to convince Congress to include a citizen suit provision in the 1970 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments. Id. Professor Sax argued that budgetary constraints and political forces prevent
effective environmental enforcement by the Government. See Peter H. Lehner, The Efficiency
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a citizen suit provision in the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act. 1
Because the legislators minmized debate so as to appear bipartisan on
environmental protection, Congress left little evidence documenting the true
purpose behind the creation of the citizen suit. 32 Using the Clean Air Act as
a model, Congress has included citizen enforcement provisions in nearly
every other federal environmental statute enacted since 1970."3 Because the
Clean Air Act serves as a basis for most environmental citizen suit provi-
sions, including EPCRA, the legislative history and development of this
initial citizen suit provision is important to understand subsequent environ-
mental statutes.34
In its report on the Clean Air Act amendments, the Senate Committee
on Public Works (Senate Committee) stated that citizen suits should motivate
of Citizen Suits, ALB. L. ENvTL. OUTLOOK, Fall 1995, at 4, 4 (discussing Professor Sax's
advocacy of citizen suit provisions). See generally JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRON-
MENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971) (discussing citizens' role in environmental
enforcement).
31. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994). The earliest version of a statutory
citizen suit appeared in the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970. See AXLINE,
supra note 21, § 1.02, at 1-5 (discussing citizen suit development). The Senate used similar
language in the citizen suit provision in Senate Bill 3575, the Environmental Protection Act
of 1970. S. 3575, 91st Cong. § 3 (1970); see AxLnE, supra note 21, § 1.02, at 1-5 to -6
(discussing early environmental citizen suit legislation). Although this bill never passed,
Professor Axline believes it was a catalyst for including a citizen suit provision in the Clean
Air Act. Id. § 1.02, at 1-7
32. See MILLER & ENviRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 2.1, at 4-5 (describing
debate over citizen suit provision in Clean Air Amendments). Proponents claimed that the
citizen suits would provide a check on ineffective or absent government enforcement. Id. at
4. Opponents claimed that the provision would increase the burden on the overcrowded court
system. Id. at 5. Proponents switched their tack to arguing that the country needed citizen
suits to correct for insufficient government resources allotted to environmental enforcement.
Id., see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tram, 510 F.2d 692, 699-700, 723-30
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing model citizen suit legislative history and debate); Note, Notice
by Citizen Plaintiffs in Environmental Litigation, 79 MICH. L. REv 299, 301-07 (1980)
(reviewing legislative history of notice requirements in citizen suits).
33. See AXLINE, supra note 21, § 1.02, at 1-8 (stating that nearly every environmental
statute enacted since 1970 has included citizen suit provision very similar to that in Clean Air
Act of 1970); MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 2.01, at 6 (stating that
when drafting citizen suit provisions, Congress tended literally to "lift" § 304 from Clean Air
Act making only modest changes).
34. See 1 GRAD, supra note 7, § 2.03[19], at 2-473 (stating that "citizen enforcement
has become so widely accepted that there is little general discussion of the issue and it is easy
to forget both the contribution of the [1970 Clean Air Act] and the problem public interest
litigants faced before its enactment"); MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9,
§ 2.2, at 7 (stating that because citizen suit sections are virtually identical, precedent under one
typically applies to others).
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governmental agencies to initiate environmental enforcement and abatement
proceedings. 5 Citizen enforcement concerned industry executives because
the executives thought it would lead to frivolous and harassing lawsuits.36
Although urged by industry groups to eliminate the citizen suit provision, the
Senate Committee did not yield to this pressure. 37 The Senate Committee
was aware of concern in the courts that citizen enforcement of legislation
would overload the dockets, but it encouraged courts to endorse citizen
participation in protection of the environment. 8
The citizen suit provision in the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments
required citizens to file notice of intent to sue with the federal or state agency
charged with pollution control, as well as with the alleged polluter.39 This
35. S. REP No. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970), reprinted in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF
1970, at 397, 436-37 (1974). The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act originated in Senate
Bill 4358. S. 4358, 91st Cong. (1970). Its companion m the House, House Bill 17255, did
not contain a citizen suit provision. H.R. 17255, 91st Cong. (1970); see H.R. CONF REP
No. 91-1783, at 55-56 (1970) (discussing evolution of citizen suit provision), reprinted in
1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 151, 205-06 (1974). The conference committee
retained the Senate version with minor modifications. Id.
36. See Letter from James D. Kittelton, Director, Environmental Activities, American
Mining Congress to Mr. Richard Grundy, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on
Public Works 2 (Aug. 26, 1970) (recommending modification of citizen suit provision to allow
legal action against only government instrumentalities or agencies), reprinted in Air Pollution,
1970: Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong. 1575 (1970).
37 See S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 38 (discussing addition of provision that would allow
award of litigation costs to defendants to prevent frivolous actions), reprinted in
1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 397, 438 (1974); see also AXLIm, supra note 21,
§ 1.02, at 1-6 to -7 (discussing Nixon Administration's opposition to citizen suit provisions).
38. See S. REP No. 91-1196, at 36-38 (discussing use of citizen suits), reprinted in 1
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 397, 436-38 (1974). The Committee report stated:
"[Clourts should recognize that in bringing (such actions] under this section citizens would be
performing a public service and in such instances the courts should award costs of litigation
to such party " Id. at 38; see also Jeannette L. Austin, Comment, The Rise of Citizen-Suit
Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81
Nw. U. L. REV 220, 260-61 (1987) (discussing citizen role in enforcement of environmental
statutes).
39. Clean Air Act § 304(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1) (1994). An early version of the
Clean Air Act did not include the alleged violator in the notice provision. See Air Pollution,
1970: Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong. pt. 5, V, LXXX (1970) (provid-
ing draft air pollution bill designated "Committee Print No. 1" from Subcommittee on Air and
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notice encouraged government agencies to enforce pollution control laws."
The notice also provided an opportunity for government intervention m the
action.41 If the agency did not initiate abatement proceedings within the
notice period,42 the citizen could file an action m federal district court.43 In
some situations, citizens could file suit before the notice period elapsed.
44
The Senate report did not discuss the disposition of the citizen suit if the
alleged violator came into compliance during the notice penod. 45 However,
Water Pollution). The draft bill required a citizen plaintiff to provide notice of intent to file
suit only to the federal and state environmental regulators. Id. at LXXX.
40. See S. REP No. 91-1196, at 37 (1970) (explaining purpose of notice period),
reprinted in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 397, 437 (1974); see also MILLER &
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 6.1, at 44-51 (tracing purpose of 60-day notice
provision).
41. See S. REP No. 91-1196, at 37 (1970) (explaining notice period gives government
opportunity to act), reprinted in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 397, 437 (1974). The
Senate report stated that the "time between notice and filing of the action should give the
administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged violation." Id.
42. The final version of the bill changed the notice period from 30 to 60 days. See H.R.
CONF REP No. 91-1783, at 56 (1970) (noting change m final version), repnnted in 1
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 151, 206 (1974); see also MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INST., supra note 9, § 6.1, at 45 (arguing that Congress changed notice period from 30
to 60 days to placate opponents of citizen suits).
43. Clean Air Act § 304(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b).
44. See id. (providing that citizens may bring suits alleging violations of orders of EPA
Administrator "immediately" after giving notice). The Clean Air Act citizen suit provision
waives the waiting period for suits alleging violations of hazardous pollution provisions. Id.,
see also Clean Water Act § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994) (waivmg 60 day notice period
for violations of new source pretreatment or toxic substance release standards). Notice is also
unnecessary under other citizen suit provisions if the violation creates an mmiment threat to
the plaintiffs health or safety or unmediately affects the plaintiff's legal rights. See Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520(b)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(b)(2) (1994)
(allowing citizen suits when violation constitutes mmiment threat to health or safety or affects
legal interest of plaintiff; Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendment of 1978 § 23(a)(3),
43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(3) (1994) (same); see also AXLINE, supra note 21, § 6.05, at 6-9 to -11
(discussing other examples of exceptions to notice requirement in various environmental
statutes). Professor Axline states that the numerous exceptions demonstrate the political,
rather than logical rationale for the notice requirement. Id. § 6.05, at 6-10 to -11. He argues
that the purpose of the notice requirement - opportunity for government preemptive enforce-
ment - evaporates when citizens can file suit immediately. Id.
45. Despite clais to the contrary, legislative history of the citizen suit does not indicate
that one purpose of the notice period is to allow the alleged violator to come into compliance
with the Act. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 60 (1987) (analyzing citizen suit provision and concluding that "[ilt follows logically that
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the Committee encouraged courts to award the citizen plaintiff reasonable
litigation expenses even when the defendant corrected the violation before
the court issued its verdict m the case.46
After passing the Clean Air Act, Congress turned its attention to other
environmental problems. In 1972, Congress passed the Clean Water Act and
included a citizen suit provision modeled after the Clean Air Act provision.47
In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court considered the proper interpretation of the
Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision." Responding to years of dispute,
the Gwaltney Court concluded that the Clean Water Act did not authorize
citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act.49 The Court read the
"alleged to be m violation" language of the citizen suit provisions' to require
a present violation rather than a purely historical one." The Court stated,
the purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into
complete compliance with the Act"). In a later opimon, the Supreme Court used its interpreta-
tion of the Clean Water Act in Gwaltney as evidence of the legislative intent of the notice
provision. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989). Supreme Court logic
does not equal congressional intent. See MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note
9, § 6.1, at 52 (criticizing Supreme Court's analysis of legislative history of notice provision);
see also Note, supra note 32, at 304 (stating that m Senate debate, supporters of citizen suits
believed that threat of suit would encourage violators to comply with Act). It is important to
note that an early version of this provision did not provide notice to the alleged violator. See
supra note 39 (discussing early draft of the Clean Air Act).
46. See S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 38 (describing situations where courts should award
citizen plaintiffs their litigation expenses), reprinted in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DMSION,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATrvE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970,
at 397, 438 (1974). The Committee stated, "[f]f as a result of a citizen proceeding and before
a verdict is issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may award litigation expenses
borne by the plaintiffs m prosecuting such actions." Id.
47 See S. REP No. 92-414, at 79 (1971) (noting that Congress modeled Clean Water
Act citizen suit provision after Clean Air Act), reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACr AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1497 (1973).
48. Gwaltney of Snthfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987).
49. See id. at 55-56, 64 (noting split among First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits and con-
cluding Clean Water Act did not allow citizens to sue for wholly past violations); see also
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 1986)
(allowing citizen suits for wholly past violations), rev'd, 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Pawtuxet Cove
Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986) (forbidding suits
based solely on historical violations, but allowing citizen suit when citizen plaintiff alleges
continuing likelihood that defendant, if not enjoined, will again violate Clean Water Act);
Haniker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that
Clean Water Act required plaintiff to "allege a violation occurring at the time the complaint
is filed").
50. Clean Water Act § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994).
51. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57 (noting most natural reading requires continuous or
intermittent violation).
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however, that the Clean Water Act authorized a citizen suit if the plaintiff
alleged, in good faith, a continuous or intermittent violation of the Act. 2
Since its first incorporation of a citizen suit provision in the Clean Air
Act, Congress has included similar citizen suit provisions m nearly every
environmental law passed, including the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act,53 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA),54 and the Endangered Species Act.55 Although
Congress typically used similar wording in drafting these various provisions,
it modified the language to fit within the respective statutory scheme.
56
Because the model provision does not necessarily fit every statutory scheme,
Congress has occasionally, and possibly unintentionally, drafted citizen suit
provisions such that enforcement authority of citizens is actually broader
than the authority of the EPAY
To address concerns about storage of hazardous chemicals in commum-
ties, Congress passed EPCRA.5' The Bhopal incident, which was the genesis
of EPCRA, occurred while Congress was considering amendments to
CERCLA.59 As its name implies, EPCRA has two primary functions. First,
EPCRA authorizes collection and dissemination of information to citizens
52. Id. at 64.
53. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994).
54. CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
55. Endangered Species Act § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); see AXLNE, supra
note 21, § 1.02, at 1-8 (noting every major federal environmental law passed since 1972,
except Marine Mammal Protection Act and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, has contained citizen suit provision); MILLER & ENviRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra
note 9, § 2.1, at 5-6 & n.10 (citing environmental statutes with citizen suit provisions);
Shavelson, supra note 5, at 29 & n.5 (discussing pervasiveness of citizen suits in environmen-
tal legislation); see also Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994)
(authorizmg citizen suits); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (same); Safe Drinking
Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994) (same); EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046
(1994) (same).
56. See MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 2.1, at 6 (noting that
Congress used very similar language m drafting various citizen suit provisions).
57 See id. §§ 2.2, 4.0, at 6, 33-34 (noting that citizens are able to enforce more
provisions of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and Safe Drinking Water Act than
EPA). Professor Miller suggests that Congress probably did not intend this result and states
that the error was likely due to poor drafting by Congress. Id. § 2.2, at 6.
58. See H.R. REP No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 59, 110-11 (1985) (stating program provides
citizens expanded information concerning hazardous chemicals in their communities),
reprnted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2841, 2892-93; see also Wolf, supra note 3, at 218-21
(discussing development of EPCRA).




concerning hazardous substances stored m their communities.6 Second,
EPCRA creates community based groups that use this information to formu-
late and administer emergency response plans m case of a hazardous chemi-
cal release. 61 Congress incorporated community right-to-know and planning
provisions into the CERCLA amendments and passed a single bill, the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 62 However,
Congress retained EPCRA and CERCLA as independent and separately
named acts.' The incorporation of CERCLA and EPCRA into a single bill
is noteworthy because Congress enacted two separate citizen suit provisions
in SARA, one under CERCLAe4 and the other under EPCRA. 65 These two
provisions are markedly different; the CERCLA citizen suit provision
follows the Clean Air Act model, while the EPCRA provision departs from
the model citizen suit language.' It is likely that Congress intentionally
drafted the two provisions differently because it enacted the differing provi-
sions in the same bill.67 Like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act,
60. See id. at 220 (describing functions of EPCRA); see also Atlantic States Legal
Found. v Buffalo Envelope Co., No. CIV-90-1110S, 1991 WL 183772, at *5 (W.D.N.Y
Sept. 10, 1991) (noting that failure to comply with requirements of EPCRA would undermine
EPCRA's two functions).
61. See Wolf, supra note 3, at 220 (describing functions of EPCRA).
62. See id. at 219 (discussing EPCRA's start as separate bill and noting its later
incorporation into SARA); Shavelson, supra note 5, at 37 (noting EPCRA inclusion in
SARA). CERCLA is also known colloquially as Superfund.
63. Wolf, supra note 3, at 219.
64. CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994).
65. The citizen suit provision came from Senate Bill 51. S. 51, 99th Cong. (1985); see
H.R. CONF REP No. 99-962, at 309 (1986) (noting that House version had no comparable
citizen suit provision), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3402.
66. The language used by Congress in EPCRA's citizen suit provision is substantially
different from that in other environmental legislation. Compare Toxic Substances Control Act
§ 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994) (authorizing citizen suits against any person "alleged to be in
violation of" Act), and Endangered Species Act § Il(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994) (same),
and Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (same), and Safe Drinking Water Act
§ 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994) (same), and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
§ 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (same), and CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994) (same),
with EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994) (authorizing citizen suits against "an owner
or operator of a facility for failure to complete and submit" forms and data sheets required
under Act). Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1990 to allow citizen suits against any
person "alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been
repeated) or to be in violation" of the Act. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994).
67 See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (describing rule of apparent
negative pregnant, one common rule of statutory construction). "[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclu-
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the CERCLA provision authorizes suits against persons "alleged to be m
violation" of CERCLA, whereas EPCRA's citizen suit provision allows suits
for failure to "complete and submit" required information.6s
In 1990, Congress reacted to the Gwaltney decision and amended the
Clean Air Act citizen suit provisions.69 The amended statute affords citizens
the right to sue for past violations if there is evidence that the facility repeat-
edly violated the statute.7' Some courts have used this amendment as evi-
dence that Congress intended to overrule the Supreme Court's decision m
Gwaltney and have extended this reasoning to interpret other environmental
citizen suit provisions.7' Others have stated that Congress may have intended
to codify the continuing violation requirement of Gwaltney n Because
sion or exclusion." Id. (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ba, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.
1972)). The Supreme Court's recent narrowing of the negative pregnant does not apply to
SARA. See Field v Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437, 442-43 (1995) (refusing to apply apparent
negative pregnant rule m bankruptcy case when rule's application offends common sense).
The Court specifically stated that the rule is most useful when contrasting simultaneously
enacted statutory sections. Id. at 446; see also Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395,
404 (1991) (applying negative pregnant rule when single enactment created provisions with
differing language); Shavelson, supra note 5, at 37 (noting difference between EPCRA and
CERCLA citizen suit provisions and suggesting that difference demonstrates clear congressio-
nal "intent that citizens could pursue past violations" under EPCRA).
68. Compare Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provision), and Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (Clean Air Act's
citizen suit provision), and CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994) (CERCLA's citizen suit
provision), with EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994) (EPCRA's citizen suit provision).
69. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 707(g), 104 Stat.
2399, 2683 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)) (1994) (allowing citizen to recover
civil penalties and allowing actions for past violations if there is evidence of repeated viola-
tions); James M. Hecker, The Citizen's Role n Environmental Enforcement: Private Attorney
General, Private Citizen, or Both?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1994, at 31, 32
(stating that congressional disagreement with result m Gwaltney resulted in 1990 Clean Air
Act amendments). Many legislators have criticized Gwaltney as bad enforcement policy. See
id. (citing 136 CONG. REc. 5277, 5279, 5286, 5354-55, 5357-58 (1990) (statements of
Senators Lieberman, Chafee, Durenburger, Baucus, and Mitchell), and noting Senators' dis-
agreement with Gwaltney decision); see also Cohen & Haire, supra note 9, at 46 (predicting
that 1990 amendments to Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision likely will create confusion).
70. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 707(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g); see also
AXLiNE, supra note 21, § 6.08, at 6-39 (predicting that Congress will likely adopt provisions
similar to 1990 Clean Air Act amendments in other citizen suit provisions).
71. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that Gwaltney's reasoning may no longer be compelling because of 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Whiting
Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F Supp. 745, 753 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments undercut Gwaltney and support conclusion that citizen suits are allowed
for wholly past violations under EPCRA).
72. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, Inc., 61 F.3d 473,
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Congress used the Clean Air Act model when originally drafting other
environmental citizen suit provisions, most citizen suit provisions contain the
same "alleged to be m violation" language. 3 Recently, Congress has consid-
ered amendments to other environmental laws to allow expanded citizen
enforcement for historical violations.74
107. The Judiciary and Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Laws
In the 1970s, most citizen plaintiffs used the citizen suit provisions to
file actions against administrative agencies for failure to complete nondis-
cretionary duties.75 In the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration decreased
477 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that by failing to amend EPCRA similarly, Congress could have
intended to limit EPCRA citizen suits to ongoing violations); mifra notes 104-08 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Gwaltney's continuing violation requirement); see also Cohen & Haire,
supra note 9, at 46-47 (discussing Bush Adninistration's interpretation of 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments). President Bush, m his statement upon signing the Clean Air Act Amendments
into law, stated:
[Un providing for citizen suits for civil penalties, the Congress has codified the
Supreme Court's interpretation of such provisions in the Gwaltney case. As the
Constitution requires, litigants must show, at a minimum, intermittent, rather than
purely past, violations of the statute in order to bring suit. Tius requirement
respects the constitutional limitations on the judicial power and avoids an intrusion
into the law-enforcement responsibilities of the executive branch.
George Bush, Statement on Signing the Bill Amending the Clean Air Act, PuB. PAPERS 1602,
1604 (1990). The parenthetical "(if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been
repeated)" included in the amendment prompted President Bush's reading. Cohen & Haire,
supra note 9, at 46.
73. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that follow model
citizen suit provision).
74. See Hecker, supra note 69, at 32 (noting congressional consideration of similar
amendment to Clean Water Act); see also S. 1114, 103d Cong. § 503 (1993) (containing
proposed amendment to Clean Water Act to allow suits for wholly past violations).
75. See Karl S. Coplan, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws - The
Citizen Suit Provisions, ENvTL. LITIG., SA85 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1033, 1038 (1996) (describing
use of citizen suit in 1970s); see also William H. Timbers & David A. Wirth, Private Rights
of Action and Judicial Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV 403, 409-
10 (1985) (describing difference between citizen suits against administrators and citizen suits
against regulated industry). Professor Coplan states that recently there has been a shift from
suits brought by national environmental organizations to a decentralized citizen enforcement
effort. Coplan, supra, at 1038. These suits are now brought by all sorts of plaintiffs. Id.
He also states that the EPA and Department of Justice are now strong supporters of citizen
suits as an enhancement of their enforcement efforts. Id., see also MILLER & ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAw INsT., supra note 9, § 2.3, at 10-11 (describing early use of citizen suits). Note,
however, that the drafters of the original citizen suit provision m the Clean Air Act expected
suits against government enforcers to be the primary use of citizen suits. See supra note 35
and accompanying text (describing drafters' expectations).
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emphasis on environmental enforcement. 76 Large environmental orgamza-
tions responded by shifting their focus away from suits against the govern-
ment to suits against regulated industries.' The decline m federal enforce-
ment from 1980 to 1982 corresponded with a marked increase m citizen
suits.78 By the nud-1980s, environmental organizations had filed nearly two
hundred citizen suits against private industry 79 In 1984, the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation (CBF) and the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) filed
such a suit against Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd
A. Gwaltney, Wholly Past Violations, and the Continuing
Violation Requirement
During the operation of its meat packing plant, Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. (Gwaltney) discharged a variety of pollutants into the Pagan River.8'
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, Gwaltney obtained a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit that allowed discharge up
to specified levels.Y Between 1981 and 1984, Gwaltney repeatedly violated
76. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 21, at 876 (describing Reagan administration's
environmental enforcement policy). Professors Boyer and Meidinger noted that "[tlhe 1981
appointment of Anne Gorsuch Burford as Administrator of the EPA brought a dramatic change
in the agency's enforcement philosophy, and accelerated the loss of faith in government en-
forcement." Id. They noted that voluntary compliance negotiations dominated EPA's enforce-
ment procedures, and prosecution in court was rare. Id.
77 See MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 2.3, at 12 (noting
marked decline in federal enforcement from 1980 to 1982 corresponds to increase in citizen
enforcement); Coplan, supra note 75, at 1038 (discussing shift from citizens suits against
government to suits against regulated industries).
78. See 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., CIzEN SuITs: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN
ENFORCEMENT ACIiONS UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES, 10, 27, 39 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter ELI Study], cited in MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INsT., supra note 9, § 2.3, at 12
(discussing results of ELI Study). Professor Miller suggests that this decline prompted orgam-
zations such as National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to use citizen suits to reverse
EPA's enforcement breakdown and goad the agency into action. MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw INST., supra note 9, § 2.3, at 11. NRDC used student interns to review federal and state
records and targeted major industrial facilities that had multiple and serious violations. Id.
NRDC filed several citizen suits and hoped to produce a self-sustaining effort by using
recovered attorneys fees to fund future cases. Id.
79. See MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 2.3, at 13-14 (stating
that of 349 notices of intent to sue issues, 189 led to citizen suits).
80. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 54 (1987);
see also MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 2.3, at 11-12 (describing
NRDC's method of using student interns and technical consultants to discover and target
potential defendants for citizen suits).




the Clean Water Act by exceeding the permit's effluent limitations. 3 After
reviewing Gwaltney's discharge monitor report, CBF and NRDC discovered
Gwaltney's violations.' In February 1984, CBF and NRDC sent a notice
of intent to commence a citizen suit to Gwaltney, to the EPA Administrator,
and to the Virginia State Water Control Board.8' In June 1984, CBF and
NRDC filed a citizen suit and alleged that Gwaltney violated and would
continue to violate the NPDES permit.' Gwaltney moved for dismissal of
the action because the last recorded violation occurred several weeks before
the plaintiffs filed suit.Y Gwaltney lost m both the district court8a and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 9 Both the district
court and the circuit court concluded that the Clean Water Act authorized
citizens to sue for historical violations.' Gwaltney then appealed to the
Supreme Court. Faced with a split m the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted Gwaltney's petition for certiorari.91
The Gwaltney Court began with an analysis of the plain language of the
Clean Water Act citizen suit statute z and noted that the provision's language
was somewhat ambiguous. 93 According to the Court, the most natural
reading of the "alleged to be in violation" language required the plaintiff to
allege that the polluter either was continuing to violate or was intermittently
83. Id.
84. Id. at 54.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87 Id. at 54-55.
88. See id. at 55 (citing Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney, 611 F Supp. 1542, 1547
(E.D. Va. 1985)). The district court found that citizens could bring actions based on historical
violations. Id.
89. See id. at 58 (citing Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d 304, 309
(4th Cir. 1986)). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Id. The court
also interpreted the citizen suit provisions as allowing actions for wholly historical violations.
Id.
90. Id. at 55-56.
91. See id. at 56 (stating Court's reason for taking case was to resolve conflicting inter-
pretations by lower courts); Timothy A. Wilkins, Note, Mootness Doctrine and the Post-
Compliance Pursuit of Civil Penalties in Environmental Citizen Suits, 17 HARV ENVTL. L.
REv 389, 392 (1993) (noting conflict among First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits); see also
Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986)
(requiring continuing likelihood that defendant will repeatedly violate Clean Water Act); Ham-
ker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1985) (requiring ongoing
violation of Clean Water Act at time plaintiff filed suit).
92. Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994); see supra note 17 (providing
relevant text of Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision).
93. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56-57
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violating the Act.94 The Court cited the pervasive use of present tense
throughout the citizen suit provision as support for its conclusion.' CBF and
NRDC noted the similar use of present tense m the provision that authorized
the EPA to sue for past violations96 and argued that this language demon-
strated congressional intent to allow citizens to sue for historical violations.'
The Court rejected tlus argument and concluded that citizens, unlike the
EPA, may sue only to stop an ongoing violation.9"
Without citing supportive legislative history regarding the notice provi-
sion, the Court asserted that its decision was m accord with legislative
mtent.99 To support its reasoning, the Court pointed to the statutory bar
94. Id. at 57 The Court rationalized its interpretation by noting that Congress could
have phrased the statute m the past tense. Id. The Court pointed to the Solid Waste Disposal
Act as proof that Congress knew how to explicitly authorize citizen suits for wholly past
violations. Id. at 57 n.2; Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994).
95. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59. In support of its analysis, the Court noted four other
sections which used present tense. Id. For example, the use of present tense m the definition
of citizen as "a person having an interest which is or may be adversely affected by the
defendant's violations of the Act." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Clean Water Act § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994)).
96. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58; see Clean Water Act § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1)
(1994) (authorizing EPA Administrator to commence enforcement action if Administrator
finds "any person is in violation").
97 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58. After reviewing both statutes, the Court stated that this
argument did not "withstand close scrutiny." Id. According to the Court, the "is in violation"
language referred to by the plaintiffs did not grant EPA the authorization to collect civil penal-
ties. Id., Clean Water Act § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1). Congress provided authori-
zation to collect civil penalties in a separate section. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58 (citing Clean
Water Act § 309(d)). But see Hecker, supra note 69, at 32 (criticizing Court for failure to
equate citizen suit provision language with government enforcement provision). Mr. Hecker
argues that the nearly identical language of both provisions demonstrates that Congress
intended courts to treat citizen plaintiffs like private attorneys general who should be able to
sue for wholly past violations. Id.
98. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58-59.
99. See id. at 60 (concluding that one purpose of 60-day notice period is to allow alleged
violator to come into compliance). The Court did not point to any evidence of its conclusion
in the legislative history of the citizen suit notice period, but simply stated that "it follows
logically " Id. at 60. The Court discussed the Clean Water Act legislative history in a
separate part of its opinion and ignored statements m the legislative reports that discussed the
purpose of the notice period. Id. at 61-62. The Court reviewed congressional statements that
discussed citizens suits as injunctive measures. Id. at 61. From these, the Court concluded
that Congress intended citizen suits to have an interstitial role in enforcement and to supple-
ment rather than supplant government enforcement actions. Id. at 60. Much of the debate
over the citizen suit provision in the Clean Water Act centered on the definition of "citizen"
and whether the Act should permit environmental organizations to sue under the citizen suit
provision. See 119 CONG. REc. 10,771-74 (1972) (considering amendment to modify defim-
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against a citizen suit when the EPA or a state agency commences an enforce-
ment action against an alleged violator."° Tis statutory bar convinced the
Court that one purpose of the sixty-day notice was to allow the polluter to
come into compliance with the Clean Water Act, thereby rendering the
citizen suit unnecessary 101 If the purpose of the notice requirement did not
include an allowance for an alleged violator to come into compliance, the
Court reasoned, the notice to the violator would be merely gratuitous.i0 The
tion of "citizen"), repnnted m 2 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at
671-675 (1973). There is little evidence of congressional intent regarding the purpose of 60-
day notice period. See notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discussing similar lack of informa-
tion concerning Clean Air Act citizen suit 60-day notice period). The Senate Public Works
Committee, however, stated that the sixty-day notice period should give the administrative
enforcement authority an opportunity to act on the alleged violation. S. REP. No. 92414, at
80 (1971), repinted in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIv., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1415,
1498 (1973). The committee further stated that if the agency fails to act or if the citizen
believes that the agency's action is inadequate, the citizen could file the action. Id. The
committee discussed the notice provision m four paragraphs of its report; however, there was
no discussion regarding an intent to allow the alleged violator to come into compliance during
the notice period. Id. at 79-80. If Congress intended the role for the notice period suggested
by the Gwaltney Court, one would expect that Congress would at least mention this role.
100. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60; see also Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B)
(1994) (precluding citizen suit from proceeding if federal or state agency initiates abatement
proceedings).
101. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59-60. The Court's logic is particularly confusmg, especially
m light of the legislative history of this provision. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying
text (discussing legislative history of citizen suit notice provision); see also MILLER &
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 6.1, at 52 (noting that only legislative purpose
of notice requirement is to prompt government enforcement); Jeffrey G. Miller, Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.. Invitation to the Dance of Litigation,
18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10098, 10101-02 (1988) (criticizing Court's legislative
history discussion). Professor Miller states: "The Court cites nothing to suggest [allowing
violator to escape litigation] was Congress' purpose for the [sixty-day notice] requirement.
Indeed, there is no such suggestion in the legislative history " Id. at 10101.
102. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. Although the plaintiffs could provide no other reason
than "it seemed right," others have suggested a few reasons why Congress included notice to
violation. Id., see AXLINE, supra note 21, § 6.01, at 6-2 to -3 (arguing that defendants'
financial interests are best served by attempting to negotiate with plaintiff early because
meritorious citizen suits can be costly, are normally thoroughly investigated before filing
notice, and can result in large civil penalties and attorney fees); MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INST., supra note 9, § 6.1, at 52 (stating that such notice allows alleged violator to
correct the violation, negotiate early settlement, or convince complainants that citizen suit is
not warranted); see also Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that "[b]ecause each day of an EPCRA violation is a separate violation carrying
additional penalties, notice gives a violator the opportunity to limit" liability by coming into
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Court concluded that the Clean Water Act did not permit citizen suits for
wholly past violations. 3
Gwaltney won the battle, but lost the war.104 The Court noted CBF and
NRDC's good faith allegation of Gwaltney's continuing violation of its
permit."0 Recognizing the practical difficulties of detecting and proving
violations of environmental standards, the Court acknowledged that good
faith allegations satisfied jurisdictional requirements.16 The Court remanded
the case for further consideration of tius issue." Although Gwaltney holds
that a citizen may not sue for wholly past violations of the Clean Water Act,
it allows such suits if a plaintiff, in good faith, alleges continuing or intermit-
tent violations."0 8
compliance with Act), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
103. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
104. See Joel A. Waite, Comment, The Continuing Questions Regarding Citizen Suits
Under the Clean WaterAct: Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 46
WASH. & LES L. REv 313, 334 (1989) (suggesting that Gwaltney's victory might prove
illusory).
105. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
106. Id. at 64-65. Justice Scalia, with Justices Stevens and O'Connor, concurred in the
judgment of the Court, but did not join the Court's opinion regarding the continuing violation
requirement. Id. at 67 (Scalia, I., concurring). Justice Scalia suggested that the issue on
remand should be whether Gwaltney was in violation on the date the plaintiffs brought the suit.
Id. at 69. He continued: "A good or lucky day is not a state of compliance." Id. Rejecting
the "good faith allegation" requirement, he stated that a company remains m violation as long
as it has not put in place remedial measures that eliminate the cause of the problem. Id.
107 Id. at 67 Gwaltney argued that the plaintiff must prove ongoing violations before
jurisdiction attached. Id. at 64. The Court responded that Gwaltney's construction read
"alleged" out of the statute. Id. The citizen suit provision required only that the defendant
be "alleged to be m violation." Id. Upon remand, the district court reinstated its orig-
inal judgment of $1,285,322. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
688 F Supp. 1078, 1080 (E.D. Va. 1988). The Fourth Circuit reduced this award to
$289,000. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 698 (4th
Cir. 1989); see also AXUINE, supra note 21, § 6.08, at 6-37 (discussing Gwaltney subsequent
history).
108. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65. The Court noted that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should prevent suits premised on baseless allegations. Id. Many courts have
interpreted the Court's requirement of a continuing or intermittent violation broadly and have
allowed direct proof of actual violations or proof of a reasonable likelihood that violations will
recur. See David T. Buente, Citizen Suits and the Clean AirActAmendments of 1990: Closing
the Enforcement Loop, 21 ENVTL. L. 2233, 2237 (1991) (noting considerable appellate
litigation over what plaintiffs must prove to demonstrate eastence of ongoing violations);
Albert C. Lm, Application of the Continuing Violations Doctrine to Environmental Law, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 723, 764-65 (1996) (noting lower courts' broad interpretation of continuing
violation requirement); see also AXUNE, supra note 21, § 6.08, at 6-35 to -38 (noting broad
interpretation of continuing violation requirement).
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In dicta, the Gwaltney Court recommended a limited role for citizen
participation m enforcement of environmental policy 109 The Court posed a
hypothetical that illustrated its critique of citizen suits."11 The hypothetical
demonstrates the Gwaltney Court's concern that citizen suits for past viola-
tions could prevent effective EPA enforcement and would limit EPA's
enforcement options."' The Supreme Court cautioned that giving citizens
the same enforcement power as the government to sue for historical viola-
tions would transform citizens into policymakers. "2 The Supreme Court's
109. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61. The Court stated that the effect of citizen suits is "to
supplement rather than to supplant government action." Id. at 60. This statement has been
used by numerous courts to limit severely the use of citizen suits. See North & S. Rivers
Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1991) (relying on dicta
in Gwaltney to preclude injunctive relief otherwise allowed by statute in citizen suit); Hecker,
supra note 69, at 33-34 (discussing use of this dicta by various courts). But see David R.
Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not
Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their
Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV 1552, 1640-41 (1995) (criticizing First Circuit's use of dicta from
Gwaltney); 118 CONG. REc. 33,716 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (contending that
"[citizen suits - in which the plaintiff cannot collect damages for himself, but can simply
seek an injunction to prevent violations - can be a very important tool for keeping industry
and Government alike from letting standards and enforcement slip").
110. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61. The Court posed the following hypothetical:
Suppose that the Administrator identified a violator of the Act and issued a compli-
ance order under [the Act]. Suppose further that the Admunstrator agreed not to
assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the condition that the violator take some
extreme corrective action, such as to install particularly effective but expensive
machinery, that it otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file
suit, months or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the Admimstra-
tor chose to forgo, then the Administrator's discretion to enforce the Act m the
public interest would be curtailed considerably.
Id. But see Hecker, supra note 69, at 34 (criticizing Gwaltney Court's hypothetical as "incon-
sistent with the remedy that Congress defined").
111. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61.
112. Id. at 61. The Court stated that allowing citizen suits for wholly past violations
would "change the nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially intrusive." Id.
But see Hecker, supra note 69, at 34 (criticizing this statement by Court); Miller, supra note
101, at 10102 (asserting that Court's statement has nothing to do with wholly past violations
but rather with Court's abhorrence of citizen enforcement in general). Mr. Hecker states that
if the Court's dicta are read broadly, citizens would be seen as competing with government
in enforcement of environmental laws. Hecker, supra note 69, at-34. He suggests that this
notion is contrary to the enforcement scheme created by Congress that allows some duplication
between government and citizen enforcement. Id. But see Colleen M. Wolter, Note &
Comment, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: The Supreme Court
Disallows Citizen Suits for Wholly Past Violations of the Clean Water Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 425,
447 (1989) (responding to criticism of Gwaltney).
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reluctance to fully endorse citizen suits set the stage for conflicts in the lower
courts under statutes other than the Clean Water Act.
B. Historcal Violations and the Notice Requirement Under EPCRA
Not surprisingly, many defendants in environmental citizen suits have
used Gwaltney to argue for dismissal of citizen suits.113 Recently, at least
one commentator has questioned Gwaltney's application to citizen suits under
EPCRA. "4 Moving away from the traditional regulatory scheme used both
in the Clean Water Act and discussed in Gwaltney, Congress drafted EPCRA
to empower citizens and to provide readily accessible information regarding
the chemicals stored in communities.1 5 The wording and structure of the
EPCRA citizen suit provision differs substantially from that of the Clean
Water Act." 6 The Clean Water Act follows the model "alleged to be m
violation" language, but EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for "failure to
complete and submit" required reports.11 7 Until the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Atlantic States Legal Foundation v United Musical Instruments, Inc.,
every district court that considered the "Gwaltney defense" in an EPCRA
citizen suit rejected it."'
113. See Hecker, supra note 69, at 34 (discussing defendants' reliance on Gwaltney);
Hodas, supra note 109, 1642-45 (discussing flawed use of Gwaltney's dicta); see also Don't
Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F Supp. 972, 979 (D. Anz 1997) (rejecting
defendant's argument, borrowed from Gwaltney, that citizen suits could "supplant, rather than
supplement" EPA enforcement); North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949
F.2d 552, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1991) (relying on dicta in Gwaltney to uphold dismissal of citizen
suit).
114. See Shavelson, supra note 5, at 36 (comparing language differences in EPCRA and
Clean Water Act citizen suit provision and suggesting Gwaltney analysis inapplicable to
EPCRA).
115. See id. at 30 (describing difference between EPCRA and other federal environmental
legislation); Wolf, supra note 3, at 220-21 (stating that although obscure, EPCRA right-to-
know feature provides citizens with powerful weapon).
116. Compare EPCRA § 326(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994), quoted at supra note
8, with Clean Water Act § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994), quoted at supra note 17
(illustrating provisions' differing language).
117 See supra note 66 (comparing EPCRA citizen suit provision to other citizen suit
provisions).
118. See Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F Supp. 1132,
1141 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (rejecting extension of Gwaltney to citizen suit under EPCRA); Wil-
liams v. Leybold Tech., Inc., 784 F Supp. 765, 768 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same); Atlantic
States Legal Found., Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope Co., No. CIV-90-1110S, 1991 WL 183772,
at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1991) (same); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-
Up Door Mfg., 772 F Supp. 745, 753 (W.D.N.Y 1991) (same); see also Shavelson, supra
note 5, at 36 (noting initial refusals to extend Gwaltney to EPCRA citizen suits).
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On July 17, 1992, Atlantic States Legal Foundation (Foundation) sent
United Musical Instruments (Musical), a manufacturer of musical mstru-
ments, notice of intent to sue for failure to timely submit required ieforma-
tion under EPCRA for the reporting years 1987 through 1990.19 Foundation
attempted to negotiate a settlement with Musical.'" Although these negotia-
tions failed, Musical corrected the violations prior to July 21, 1993, when
Foundation filed its complaint m federal court seeking civil penalties as well
as attorneys' fees. 2 1 The district court dismissed the action on statute of
limitations grounds, and Foundation appealed.' " On appeal, Musical m-
yoked Gwaltney and argued that the citizen suit provision under EPCRA did
not authorize citizen plaintiffs to proceed against defendants for purely
historical violations." The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the
complaint.' 24
In support of its decision, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the plain language
of the citizen suit provision, that authorizes suits for "failure to [c]om-
plete and submit" required documentation."'5 Although Congress provided
deadlines for filings elsewhere m EPCRA, the court noted that the citizen
suit provision emphasized only the "completion and filing of the form."12
The court considered the information completed and filed even though
Musical filed after the statutory deadline."z The appellate court also noted
119. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, Inc., 61 F.3d
473, 474 (6th Cir. 1995) (describing plaintiff's filing of notice of intent to sue); Shavelson,
supra note 5, at 35-36 (same). When Foundation filed its complaint, it alleged that Musical
had failed to file reports for 1988-91. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 474.
120. Shavelson, supra note 5, at 35. Atlantic States Legal Foundation is a nonprofit
public interest group known for its aggressive use of the citizen suit provision of EPCRA. Id.
at 29-30.
121. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 474-75.
122. See id. (discussing district court opinion).
123. Id. at 475.
124. Id. The district court had relied on different reasoning for dismissing the complaint.
Id. at 474-75. Although EPCRA contained no independent statute of limitations and the plain-
tiff argued for a five-year limit, the district court applied the one-year limit from Oluo law and
disnussed the complaint. Id., see also Shavelson, supra note 5, at 35-36 (discussing district
court's opinion).
125. EPCRA § 326(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994); see United Musical Instru-
ments, 61 F.3d at 475 (discussing EPCRA citizen suit provision); supra note 8 (quoting
portions of EPCRA citizen suit provision).
126. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 475.
127 Id. But see Shavelson, supra note 5, at 36 (noting that court ignored citizen suit
provision reference to EPCRA requirement that facilities submit reports by specific dates);
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that the EPA had broader authority to enforce the Act and cited this as
evidence of congressional intent to limit citizen suits to ongoing violations."
The Sixth Circuit embraced the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney and
used statements by the Court to support its own analysis. 9
Noting that Congress worded the EPCRA and Clean Water Act citizen
suit provisions differently, Foundation argued that the court's invocation of
Gwaltney was nusplaced.'O The Sixth Circuit rejected Foundation's reading
as "hypertechnical" and stated the most natural reading of EPCRA precluded
suits for purely historical violations.' The 1990 Amendments to the Clean
Air Act explicitly allow citizen suits for historical violations."' Foundation
Citizens for Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
Congress authorized citizen suits for failure to submit forms "'under' §§ 312-313" and
incorporated deadline section into provision as if the provision read "in accordance with
§§ 312-313"), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997). Section 312(a) of EPCRA, referenced
m the citizen suit provision, provides that:
(1) The owner or operator of any facility which is required to prepare or
have available a material safety data sheet for a hazardous chemical shall pre-
pare and submit an emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form to each
of the following:
(A) The appropriate local emergency planning committee.
(B) The State emergency response commission.
(C) The fire department with jurisdiction over the facility.
(2) The inventory form containing tier I information shall be submitted
on or before March 1, 1988, and annually thereafter on March 1, and shall contain
data with respect to the preceding calendar year
EPCRA § 312(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a) (emphasis added). EPCRA's citizen suit provision
authorizes suit for failure to complete and submit forms "under § 312" of the Act. EPCRA
§ 326(a)(1)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 1i046(a)(1)(A)(iii); see supra note 8 (providing relevant text
of EPCRA citizen suit provision).
128. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 475 (discussing congressional intent in
drafting EPCRA). The court noted that the civil penalty section authorizes EPA to assess and
collect civil penalties for any violation of § 313(a)'s requirements. Id., see EPCRA
§ 325(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(4) (authorizing EPA to seek civil penalties). The court
stated that Congress intentionally limited citizen suits to clais involving failure to submit
requisite forms and not for violations of other requirements of the act, like filing deadlines.
United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 475. According to the court, this difference demon-
strated congressional intent to give the EPA the sole discretion to recover penalties for past
violations. Id.
129. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 475-77 (applying Gwaltney).
130. See id. at 476-77 (discussing Foundation's argument). The court noted that
"EPCRA authorizes citizen actions for 'failure to' submit certain information, while the
Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits against persons 'alleged to be in violation' of [the
Act]." Id. at 476.
131. Id. at 477
132. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 707(g), 104 Stat.
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asserted that these amendments undercut Gwaltney and demonstrated that
Congress intended to overrule the Court's decision."' The court rejected
this argument.'34 By failing to similarly amend EPCRA, the appellate court
suggested that Congress may have intended to limit EPCRA's citizen suit
provision to violations existing at the time the plaintiff filed the suit. 13
5
Embracing the dicta from Gwaltney, the court stated that EPA should have
the sole responsibility for seeking civil penalties for past violations because
citizen suits for past violations would undermine the EPA's discretion to seek
other remedies in the public's interest. 36 The plain language and structure
of EPCRA led the court to conclude that EPCRA barred citizen suits for
purely historical Violations.
3 7
The plain language of EPCRA led the Seventh Circuit to a different
conclusion, however. The facts i Citizens for a Better Environment v Steel
2399, 2683 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1994)) (allowing suits for
historical violations). The 1990 amendments changed the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Air Act to authorize citizen suits against any person "who is alleged to have violated (if there
is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in violation [of an emission
standard] " Clean Air Act § 304(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1994); see supra notes
69-74 and accompanying text (discussing 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments).
133. See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 477 (discussing Foundation's mterpreta-
tion of Gwaltney).
134. Id.
135. Id. The court's response to the Foundation's argument is somewhat flawed. Its
reasoning assumes that Congress accepts the court's conclusion that the existing EPCRA
provision does not allow a citizen suit for past violations despite its difference from Clean Air
Act. Congress may disagree with the court and therefore an amendment would not be
required. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appeal at 13-14
n.7, Citizens for a Better Env't v Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1136)
(noting EPCRA citizen suit language is so different from Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act
that Gwaltney's textual analysis does not apply), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997); see
also Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12, Steel Co. v
Citizens for a Better Env't, 1997 WL 348166 (U.S. 1997) (No. 96-643) (citing textual
difference between EPCRA and Clean Water Act for conclusion that Gwaltney holding does
not apply to Steel Co. case); Shavelson, supra note 5, at 37 (describing court's statutory
interpretation as bordering on ludicrous). Mr. Shavelson explains that Congress does not
amend every environmental law each time it recognizes a deficiency. Id. He suggests that
Congress considers amendments to complex environmental statutes only when they are up for
reauthorization. Id.
136. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 477 This conclusion is very similar to the
hypothetical posed by the Court in Gwaltney. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987) (presenting hypothetical); supra notes 109-12 and
accompanying text (discussing hypothetical).
137 United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 478. The Clinton Administration did not
succeed in its attempt to get the Sixth Circuit to rehear the case en bane. Cohen & Haire,
supra note 9, at 50 n.110.
1251
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1227 (1997)
Co.138 are very similar to those m United Musical Instruments. '3  Citizens
for a Better Environment (Citizens), a nonprofit environmental group,
discovered violations of EPCRA, and on March 16, 1995, sent notice of
intent to sue to The Steel Company, Inc. (Steel), a Chicago steel manufac-
turer. "' After receiving the notice, Steel filed its overdue forms with the
designated agencies. 4 ' When the EPA did not initiate enforcement proceed-
rags within the sixty-day notice period, Citizens filed a complaint in federal
district court on August 7, 1995.142 The district court agreed with the Sixth
Circuit analysis in United Musical Instruments and dismissed Citizens'
complaint because it found EPCRA did not authorize citizen suits for purely
historical violations. 43 Citizens appealed." 4
Rather than applying the Gwaltney rule directly, the Seventh Circuit
began its analysis by using Gwaltney's interpretive methodology '45 The
court found that the plain language of the EPCRA citizen enforcement
provision did not point to a present violation requirement.' Noting that the
language of EPCRA contains no temporal limitation, the appellate court
stated that "'failure to do' something can indicate a failure past or present." 47
138. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting only Sixth Circuit had previously addressed issue before court and describing case as
"factually indistinguishable" from United Musical Instruments), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079
(1997).
139. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, Inc., 61 F.3d 473,
474-75 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing factual background of case).
140. Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1241. Citizens also sent the required notices
to the EPA and local authorities. Id.
141. Id. During oral argument, counsel for the defendant admitted that the defendant had
not filed the appropriate forms in accordance with the Act. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1241-42. At that time, the Sixth Circuit was the only circuit that had consid-
ered whether EPCRA authorized citizen suits for wholly past violations. Id. at 1242.
144. Id. at 1241. The United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Citizens'
interpretation of the statute. Id.
145. Id. at 1242. The court noted that the first teaching of Gwaltney was to read the
statute with its "most plain and natural meaning." Id. The court noted that the Sixth Circuit
in United Musical Instruments (and the district court in Citizens for a Better Env't) applied
Gwaltney's literal holding by analogy to EPCRA to determine that the statute did not allow
citizen suits for purely historical violations. Id.
146. Id. at 1243.
147 Id. The court distinguished Gwaltney, which found that the "alleged 'to be in viola-
tion'" language used in the Clean Water Act required a present or likely future violation for
a citizen suit to go forward. Id. at 1243-44. The Sixth Circuit called this distinction a
"hypertechnical parsing of the language of the statutes." Id., see also Atlantic States Legal
Found. v. United Musical Instruments, Inc., 61 F.3d 473,476-77 (6th Cir. 1995) (comparing
Clean Water Act and EPCRA citizen suit provisions).
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The Seventh Circuit stated that the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act, enacted after Gwaltney, demonstrated that Congress did not view the
sixty-day notice provision as mconsistent with allowing citizens to sue for past
violations.14 In further support of its holding, the court noted that Congress
incorporated filing deadlines as essential statutory elements that citizens have
authority to enforce.149 The court also provided three reasons why the notice
provision was not gratuitous.5° First, it allowed an alleged violator to correct
an erroneous claim by a citizen.' Second, the notice allowed the violator to
limit its liability by filing the late reports." Third, it provided the parties an
opportunity and an incentive to negotiate a settlement.5
The court also offered a policy argument in support of its decision. 4
The citizen suit provision allows the citizen plaintiff to recover reasonable
costs of enforcement.5 The court explained that allowing violators to es-
148. Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244. The Sixth Circuit considered and
dismissed this argument. See supra notes 132-35 (discussing Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments). The Gwaltney Court stated that one rationale for the 60-
day notice was to allow violators to come into compliance during tins notice period. Chesa-
peake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). Allowing citi-
zens to sue for past violations would undercut this purpose. Id. The Court stated that Con-
gress could not have intended the inconsistency of requiring notice to the violator and allowing
citizens to sue for purely historical violations. Id. at 61. However, m 1990, Congress
amended the Clean Air Act and allowed for citizen suits for past violations, but retained the
notice requirement. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 707(g), 104
Stat. 2399, 2683 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1994)).
149. Citizensfor a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1243. The court stated that the most natural
reading of "under" is "in accordance with." Id. at 1241. The EPCRA citizen suit provision
references §§ 312 and 313 which state that forms "shall be" submitted annually. Id., see also
S. REP No. 99-11, at 14-15 (1985) (noting goal of EPCRA to make information "available
widely and in a timely fashion").
150. Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244.
151. Id.
152. Id. Each day that a report is late is a separate violation subject to a $25,000 per day
fine. Id. at 1241. Because the EPA can enforce the Act for past violations, filing as early as
possible limits the possible civil penalties which EPA can seek. Id. at 1244. Under the citizen
suit provision, the EPA takes over enforcement during the notice period. Id.
153. Id., see MILLER& ENViRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, at 138-42 (recom-
mending that potential defendants carefully consider entering settlement negotiations to limit
expenses). Professor Miller states that early discussions may persuade citizen plaintiffs that
they have no case or should not pursue enforcement. Id. at 141. Additionally, early discus-
sions may lead to a settlement before suit is filed which could save the defendant substantial
legal costs. Id. at 141-42; see also Miller, supra note 101, at 10101 (discussing legitimate
reasons for notice requirement even where violations are wholly past).
154. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244-45 (discussing need to interpret
"citizen suit provision in a way that gives meaning to the provision as a whole").
155. EPRCA § 326(f), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(t) (1994).
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cape enforcement simply by correcting discrepancies (after receipt of notice
of an intent to sue) would undermine the purpose of EPCRA's citizen suit." 6
Private citizens would have to absorb costs associated with momtormg with
little hope of recovery " The Seventh Circuit stated that the Sixth Circuit's
view (forbidding suits for wholly past violations) would render citizen
enforcement "virtually meaningless." 58
IV Decipherng EPCRA 's "Plain" Language
Most courts have decided that EPCRA's plain language allows citizen
suits for wholly past violations."5 9 Critics of this position concede that
EPCRA's statutory language is ambiguous with regard to allowing citizen
suits for such violations."6 When interpreting ambiguous statutes, courts
must rely on the plain language of statutes in the absence of clearly ex-
pressed intent to the contrary 16 The platn language of EPCRA's citizen suit
156. Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244-45.
157 Id. at 1245.
158. Id. at 1244. The court predicted that private enforcement of the reporting require-
ments would drop off if courts accepted the Sixth Circuit's view. Id. at 1245. However, after
the Supreme Court's decision m Gwaltney, citizen enforcement remained relatively constant.
See Hodas, supra note 109, at 1573 tbl.1 (demonstrating 60-day notice filings remained fairly
constant from 1986 through 1992).
159. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding plain language of EPCRA citizen suit provision does not require present violation),
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997); Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 964 F Supp. 1448, 1452 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding EPCRA allows citizen suits
for historical violations); Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F Supp.
972, 978-79 (D. Ariz. 1997) (same); Idaho Sporting Congress v Computrol, Inc., 952 F
Supp. 690, 692-93 (D. Idaho 1996) (same); Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-
Hastings, Inc., 813 F Supp. 1132, 1141 (E.D. Penn. 1993) (same); Williams v. Leybold
Tech., Inc., 784 F Supp. 765, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same); Atlantic States Legal Found.
v. Buffalo Envelope Co., No. CIV-90-1110S, 1991 WI, 183772, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept 10,
1991) (same); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F Supp. 745,
753 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); see also Shavelson, supra note 5, at 34 (noting most courts
have allowed citizen suits for historical violations). But see Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
United Musical Instruments, Inc., 61 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 1995) (disallowing EPCRA
citizen suit for wholly past violations).
160. See Cohen & Haire, supra note 9, at 49 (noting that, as pure question of statutory
construction, one can read EPCRA citizen suit provision to allow suit for wholly past viola-
tions, but noting that such interpretation is unpersuasive); see also Idaho Sporting Congress,
952 F Supp. at 692 (stating that "failure to do" language is not without ambiguity).
161. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvama, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) (stating that starting point for statutory interpretation is ordinary language of statute).
But see Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environ-
mentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmalang Is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53
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provision does not contain a temporal limitation.162
In addition to the plain language, the structure of the citizen suit provi-
sion also provides some evidence of congressional intent. The citizen suit
provision authorizes citizen suits for violations of specific provisions of
EPCRA that include strict filing deadlines. 63 Because EPCRA is concerned
with providing information to the community in a timely manner, Congress
must have intended to allow citizen enforcement for violations of the filing
deadlines.}" EPCRA's citizen suit venue provision also suggests that Con-
gress intended to allow suits for past violations. 65 Unlike the Clean Water
Act's venue provision used in support of the Gwaltney Court's decision,1
66
the venue requirement in the EPCRA citizen enforcement provision is not
cast m the present tense.' 67 Finally, because compliance is relatively smple,
violators easily could cure the violations during the notice period. 68  If
WASH. & LEE L. REv 1231, 1271-75 (1996) (arguing that legislative history can be useful in
determining Congress's purpose for enacting particular statute).
162. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F,3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting no temporal limitation on timing of citizen suits), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079
(1997).
163. EPCRA § 326(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 10046(a)(1) (1994) (authorizing citizen suits for
violation of § 312 and § 313 of EPCRA). Sections 312 and 313 provide mandatory annual
filing deadlines as well as other submission requirements. EPCRA §§ 312-313, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11022-11023.
164. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F Supp. 745,
751 (W.D.N.Y 1991) (stating filing deadlines are first critical step in achieving intent of
EPCRA). The court suggested that if facility "owners or operators fail to comply with the
reporting requirements, including the mandatory compliance dates, the development and
success of emergency response plans would be seriously, if not critically, undercut, and the
entire thrust of EPCRA could be defeated." Id., see also Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae m Support of the Appeal at 12, Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237
(7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1136) (discussing EPCRA deadlines). "Congress intended citizens
to be able to sue facility owners and operators who fail to comply with section 312(a) and
313(a), including persons who ignore the statutory deadlines. " Id.
165. See EPCRA § 326(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1) (requiring citizen to bring suits
m district where alleged "violation occurred"); Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244
(discussing EPCRA's venue provision). "Congress's choice of language specifically referring
to past violations [is a strong indicator] that a cause of action exists under EPCRA for
violations that are not ongoing at the time a citizen complaint is filed." Id. at 1244.
166. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney Court's analysis
of pervasive use of present tense throughout citizen suit provision).
167 EPCRA § 326(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1) (stating citizens shall bring suits in
"district m which the alleged violation occurred").
168. See Wolf, supra note 3, at 271 (noting low cost of compliance with EPRCA com-
pared to potential penalties). Professor Wolf states that violators are likely to settle because
they have little incentive to litigate. Id.
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citizens cannot sue for historical violations, the citizen suit provision is
meaningless.1
69
The Gwaltney Court's concern regarding citizen suit interference with
EPA settlements does not apply to suits filed under EPCRA. 170 Congress
inserted a provision that precludes citizen enforcement ff the EPA or the
state is "diligently pursuing" enforcement.17 ' This language is another depar-
ture from the model citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970.172 Congress made it easier for the EPA to preclude citizen suits
under EPCRA.173 When entering into good faith enforcement negotiations,
neither the EPA nor the alleged violator should be concerned that citizen
suits will upset their agreements. 74
One possible criticism of this interpretation of EPCRA is that Congress
may not have intended any substantive change m authorization of citizen
169. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1996)
(discussing purpose and policy of EPCRA citizen suit provision), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
1079 (1997).
170. See supra note 110 (quoting hypothetical posed by Gwaltney Court); see also Brief
of the United States as Amicus Curiae m Support of the Appeal at 12-13, Citizens for a Better
Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1136) (describing Gwaltney
hypothetical as inapposite).
171. See H.R. REP No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 35 (1985) (discussing CERCLA and EPCRA
citizen suit provisions), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3058. The statute precludes
a citizen suit if the EPA or the state is "diligently pursuing" enforcement action. EPCRA
§ 326(e), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(e) (1994). The House Judiciary Committee stated that "the bars
are necessary to avoid the confusion or termination of settlement negotiations because
EPA, a State, or potentially responsible parties face citizen suit litigation relative to the
matters under negotiation." H.R. REP No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 35 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3058. This seems to address the concerns of the Gwaltney Court m its
hypothetical. See supra notes 109-12 (discussing Gwaltney hypothetical).
172. Compare EPCRA § 326(e), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(e) (precluding citizen suit if EPA
is pursuing enforcement), with Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1) 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (1994)
(precluding citizen suit if EPA or state "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting [an]
action m court"). Under the Clean Water Act, the Gwaltney Court's hypothetical may be
valid. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1987) (posing hypothetical that questions citizen suits).
173. See supra note 171 (discussing legislative history of "diligently pursuing" phrase).
174. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 35-36 (1985) (discussing "diligently pursuing"
language in EPCRA citizen suit provision), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3058-59.
The Committee explained that "diligent pursuit" was more than intentions or future plans on
the part of the enforcement agency to address the matter. Id. at 36, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3059; see also Hodas, supra note 109, at 1623 (noting concern by some
commentators that citizen suits may discourage innovation by EPA and regulated community).
Professor Hodas describes these fears as unfounded because EPA and industry can draft
permits and consent orders to shield themselves from citizen suits. Id.
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suits. This critique suggests that Congress was merely adjusting the lan-
guage to fit within the right-to-know statutory scheme. However, Congress
has enacted numerous other environmental statutes with widely different
schemes and has included the "alleged to be m violation" language in the
citizen suit provisions of those statutes. 5 Congress must have intended a
different result with EPCRA because it used different language. Also,
EPCRA is unlike most environmental statutes; it does not specify discharge
standards, nor does it impose liability for harming the environment. EPCRA
is an informational statute intended to provide prompt and timely notification
to citizens about chemicals stored in their communities. 76 If citizens were
unable to force facilities to meet statutory filing dates, they could not enforce
a primary goal of the Act."
An early version of the model citizen suit provision did not require
notice to alleged violators."7 The legislative history is silent on Congress's
reason for adding this requirement. Contrary to statements made by the
Supreme Court m Gwaltney, sixty-day notice to the alleged violators is not
gratuitous. 79 The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments demonstrate that Con-
gress did not consider the sixty-day notice requirement as inconsistent with
allowing suits for historical violations." Additionally, courts and commen-
tators have suggested other valid functions of the notice.18,
The plain language, legislative history, and statutory construction of
EPCRA support the Seventh Circuit's reading m Citizens for a Better Env1-
175. See supra note 66 (citing environmental statutes that use "alleged to be m violation"
language).
176. See S. REP No. 99-11, at 14 (1985) (noting goal of EPCRA is to make essential
information available widely and in timely fashion); H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 111
(1985) (noting unportance of providing information "to the public m the quickest, most
efficient way possible"), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2893.
177 See Brief of the United States as Anucus Curiae in Support of the Appeal at 15-17,
Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1136) (discuss-
ing importance of filing dates to EPCRA's purpose). "Timely reporting is, after all, why
Congress established precise annual deadlines." Id.
178. See Air Pollution, 1970: Hearngs on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. On Public Works, 91st Cong. pt.
5, V, LXXXI (1970) (providing draft air pollution bill designated "Committee Print No. 1"
from Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution).
179. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60
(1987) (suggesting purpose of notice provision is to allow violator to avoid litigation by
coming into compliance).
180. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (allowing citizen suits for historical
violations and retaining 60-day notice to violator requirement).
181. See supra notes 148-58 and accompanying text (discussing possible functions of
notice to violator).
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ronment v Steel Co."rn Although the language of the statute appears to
support the conclusion that citizen plaintiffs can sue for past violations, one
must determine if such authority is consistent with an effective enforcement
policy 18 The next section will review several issues surrounding citizen
suits m general and then consider their application to EPCRA.
A. Citizen Suits for Past Violations May Not Meet
Constitutional Standing Requirements
Congress cannot create abstract causes of action which are unrelated to
tangible or intangible benefits to the plamtiff.'84 To establish standing in an
environmental citizen suit, the plaintiff must demonstrate three elements."83
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury or invasion of a legally
protected interest.8" Second, the defendant's conduct must have caused, or
must be causally connected to, this injury "' Third, the plaintiff must prove
that the remedy sought will likely redress the injury 18
Some have suggested that citizen suits for wholly past violations raise
serious constitutional questions. 89 If the facility cures the violation, there is
182. See H.R. REP No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 33-37 (1985) (providing House Judiciary
Committee's position regarding citizen suit provision m Superfund Amendments), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3056-60. In its discussion of the 60-day notice requirement, the
Committee stated that the notice period provided EPA the opportunity to usurp enforcement
action. Id. at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3058. Similar to the legislative
history of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, the Committee did not state that the notice
period provided an opportunity for the violator to come into compliance as a reason for this
waiting period.
183. See Cohen & Haire, supra note 9, at 28-31, 49 (suggesting that allowing citizen suits
for past violations is bad enforcement policy and raises serious constitutional problems).
184. See id. at 22-24 (describing constitutional standing requirements); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992) (noting Article M limitations on Con-
gress's ability to create statutory "interests" capable of being injured).
185. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (reciting three requirements for standing).
186. See id. at 560 (requiring plaintiff to establish injury-rn-fact). The injury must be
concrete and particularized, and actual rather than hypothetical. Id.
187 See id. (describing causation as standing requirement); Cohen & Haire, supra note
9, at 24-25 (discussing environmental injury-m-fact and standing). While courts typically
presume injury and causation if a legal violation has occurred, the citizen plaintiff must still
demonstrate that he was "geographically at risk." Id. at 24.
188. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (discussing redressability as element of standing); Cohen
& Haire, supra note 9, at 26-30 (same).
189. See Cohen & Haire, supra note 9, at 28-34 (discussing constitutional concerns
regarding citizen suits). In his statement upon signing the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
bill, President Bush stated that Article I of the Constitution requires litigants to demonstrate
more than purely historical violations of the Act. George Bush, Statement on Signing the Bill
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no specific conduct that the suit will deter, and civil penalties paid to the
United States Treasury do not redress the injury that gave rise to the suit."
General deterrence may not be enough to support standing for wholly past
violations. 191 A majority of the Supreme Court has not yet decided this
issue. 192
B. Authonzation of Legal Fees Indicates Congress Intended
Expansive Citizen Participation
Under the American legal system, each party must bear its own litiga-
tion expenses, absent some other expressed authority 193 In EPCRA, Con-
Amending the Clean Air Act, PUB. PAPERS 1602, 1604 (1990). But see Sive, supra note 26,
at 56-57 (dismissing suggestion that citizen suit provisions are unconstitutional based on
standing). Mr. Sive cites cases that have also rejected this argument. Id. at 56., see Atlantic
States Legal Found. v. Buffalo Envelope Co., 823 F Supp. 1065, 1076 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that EPCRA citizen suit provision does not violate separation of powers); Atlantic
States Legal Found. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., No. 90-CV-1109S, 1993 WL 114676,
at *8-13 (W.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 1993) (finding EPCRA citizen suit provision constitutional).
190. See Cohen & Haire, supra note 9, at 29 (noting that civil payment to Treasury could
enhance general deterrence, but would not support standing).
191. See td. at 29-30 (questioning adequacy of general deterrence m meeting redressa-
bility requirement of standing). Future Injuries to the plaintiff could not support standing
because such injuries are too speculative. Id. at 29; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 563-64 (1992) (plurality opinion) (explaining that future injuries are too speculative
to support standing and that plaintiff cannot assert rights of unrelated third parties). However,
some courts have used general deterrence to establish redressability. See Public Interest
Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir. 1990)
(concluding that deterrent effect of civil penalties adequately redressed plaintiff's injuries);
Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that civil
penalties can be important deterrence against future violations of environmental laws); Student
Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F Supp. 1190, 1200-01 (D.N.J.
1985) (finding civil penalties paid to government redressed plaintiffs' injuries). Courts have
found redressibility in cases where plaintiff alleged wholly past violations of EPCRA, and one
has stated that the injury could be redressed by declaratory judgment, fining the defendant, or
enjoining it from committing future violations. Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane Foods,
Inc., 950 F Supp. 972, 980 (D. Ariz. 1997) (stating deterrence from causing future injuries
adequate to find redressability); see also Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v Kurz-Hastings,
Inc., 813 F Supp. 1132, 114041 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (discussing redressability).
192. Justice Scalia discussed redressability mLtgan. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (plurality opinion) (discussing redressability). Justices Kennedy and
Souter did not join this part of the opinion. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (refusing to
reach redressability). Writing separately, Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Scalia, but
concurred m the judgment. Id. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with conclu-
sion that injury is not redressed). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor dissented and found
"genuine issues of fact as to injury and as to redressability." Id. at 589 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
193. See MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INsTITuTE, supra note 9, § 9, at 95-130
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gress provided express authority for a citizen plaintiff to recover attorneys'
fees. 1 4 The authorization of attorneys' fees m environmental citizen suits
encourages citizen enforcement."9 Some courts have used this authorization
as proof of congressional intent to allow citizen suits for wholly past viola-
tions. 9 6 Under EPCRA, compliance is relatively easy 197 EPCRA is an
informational statute and does not require installation of expensive pollution
abatement equipment like many other environmental statutes.' 98 Most facil-
ities should be able to comply with EPCRA's requirements within the sixty-
day waiting period.' 99 Therefore, most violations will become historical
violations soon after the citizen notifies the facility of its intention to sue. °
If citizens cannot file suit for purely historical violations, then they cannot
recover the costs of their efforts to discover these violations, and the citizen
suit provision becomes meaningless."°
(discussing award of attorneys' fees in environmental citizen suits). Environmental citizen
suits authorize recovery of litigation expenses when "appropriate," while other nonenviron-
mental citizen enforcement provisions allow for recovery of attorneys' fees predicated on
success of the party. Id. at 10405. But see Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684-
86 (1983) (stating that Court would reverse presumption against award of attorneys' fees only
when there is clear statutory language or strong evidence of legislative intent).
194. EPCRA § 326(0, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(0 (1994).
195. See S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 38 (1970) (discussing authorization for attorneys' fees
m ongial environmental citizen suit provision), reprinted in 1 ENViRONMENTAL POLICY Div.,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN Am AMENDMENTS OF 1970,
at 397, 438 (1974); MILLER & ENViRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 9, § 9.7, at 127
(describing ELI study results demonstrating importance of attorneys' fees in encouraging
citizen suits).
196. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996)
(discussing award of attorneys fees under EPCRA), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
The court stated that by allowing recovery of litigation expenses, EPCRA creates a structure
wich encourages citizens to invest resources to uncover violations of the Act. Id. The court
suggested that if facility owners could prevent recovery of costs by simply "completing and
submitting" required forms during the notice period, citizens would have no real incentive to
seek out and discover EPCRA violations. Id.
197 See Wolf, supra note 3, at 271 (discussing relatively low cost of compliance with
EPCRA when compared to potential penalties). But see Petitioner's Brief at *42, Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, (U.S. filed May 2, 1997) (No. 96-643) (arguing that completion
of required forms is "no simple matter" and is particularly laborious for smaller companies),
available in 1997 WL 221790.
198. See Wolf, supra note 3, at 220 (describing EPCRA as informational statute).
199. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 90 F.3d at 1244 (noting nmmal burden of complet-
ing and submitting forms).
200. See id. at 1244 (suggesting facilities have no real incentive to comply with EPCRA




C. Effective Enforcement Hampered by Government Preemption
of Citizen Suits
Although authorized to do so by statute, the EPA does not normally
preempt a citizen suit when it receives notice of an impending citizen suit.'
Administrative bureaucracy normally prevents EPA action within the sixty-
day notice period. 3 Additionally, the Clinton Admnistration supports
citizen enforcement and is concerned that preemption may discourage citizen
suits. 2  However, states, wluch also can preempt citizen suits, are not
similarly reluctant to act.' State enforcement for the purpose of preempting
citizen suits has become more the rule than the exception, and it has caused
some environmental organizations to reconsider filing citizen suits.' If
states routinely preempt citizen suits, but do not diligently enforce the
requirements of the environmental laws, then the citizen suit provisions do
not fulfill their intended purpose of encouraging effective enforcement by
government agencies.?
D Results Depend on the Enforcer
Because most environmental statutes base penalties on the number of
days that a facility is in violation, penalties rapidly accumulate." Addition-
202. See Hodas, supra note 109, at 1647 (discussmg preclusion of citizen suits by admin-
istrative action). Professor Hodas noted that receipt of a 60-day notice letter will not stop
EPA action on a matter in which it already has begun enforcement proceedings. Id.
203. Id.
204. See itd. at 1647-48 (discussing reasons EPA does not preempt citizen suits); see also
Cohen & Haire, supra note 9, at 45, 51 (noting Clinton administration supports expanding
citizen suit authority).
205. See Hodas, supra note 109, at 1648 (discussing state agency preemption of citizen
suits).
206. Id. Professor Hodas explains that sometimes state agencies have taken enforcement
action at the polluter's request to shield the polluter from a citizen suit. Id. States have pre-
empted NRDC at least 50 times in less than 10 years, each resulting m lement sanctions
against the local polluters. Id. at 1648-49. In one situation, Michigan began enforcement
proceedings and preempted nineteen citizen suits on the 59th day after receiving notice. Id.
at 1649. The state settled these cases for what NRDC considered a slap on the wrist. Id.
Neither the state nor the violators reimbursed NRDC for the $43,000 in expenses and
attorneys fees which NRDC incurred in preparing the cases. Id. NRDC has since disbanded
its Clean Water Act enforcement project because it became too expensive in light of this type
of state preemption which precludes recovery of litigation expenses. See rt. at 1651 (attribut-
ing NRDC's disbanding due to state preemption, standing concerns, and inpact of Gwaltney).
207 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing intended purpose of citizen
suits).
208. See EPCRA § 325(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c) (1994) (providing penalties for viola-
tions of EPCRA). EPCRA authorizes EPA to seek up to $25,000 per day for violation of the
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ally, judicially mposed penalties typically are much higher than admimstra-
tively imposed penalties.' Many organizations use these potentially large
assessments as bargaining chips to goad violators into settlement agreements
rather than to force regulators into enforcement.210 The legislative history
of citizen suit provisions demonstrates that Congress intended citizen en-
forcement to encourage agency enforcement, not to produce revenue for
diligent environmental organizations.2 11 Because settlements are quicker and
easier than litigation, the EPA resolves most cases through settlement.2 2
This result is inequitable because the magnitude of the assessed penalty often
depends on whether the EPA or a citizen enforces the action against a
violator. One critic condemned such use of citizen suits as distorting policy
and creating new law rather than mere participation m enforcement of
environmental laws.2 " However, another commentator suggests that the
Act and $75,000 for repeated violations. Id. Because each day is a separate violation, the
maximum penalty for failing to file reports for one year would exceed $9,000,000. Under the
citizen suit provision, citizens are allowed to seek the same penalties, but the violator would
pay penalties to the U.S. Treasury EPCRA § 326(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c); see also
AXtUNE, supra note 21, §§ 7.03-04, at 7-5 to -19 (describing methods of calculating penalties
for violations of environmental laws); Austin, supra note 38, at 237-40 (discussing remedies
available to citizen plaintiffs). Under its civil penalty policy, the EPA does not seek the
maximum penalty, but rather sets fines based on the seriousness of the violation and economic
benefit received by the violator for not complying with the Act. See Environmental Protection
Agency, Policy on Civil Penalties (Feb. 16, 1984) (providing EPA's policy guidelines
regarding use of civil penalties), reprited in [1 Admin. Materials] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 34,083-85 (1984); AXLINE, supra note 21, § 7.04, at 7-11 to -13 (describing EPA's
penalty policy). Although not required, courts use EPA's penalty policy as an analytical guide
when determining the appropriate penalty. See Austin, supra note 38, at 238 (discussing use
of EPA penalty policy by courts).
209. See Hodas, supra note 109, at 1613-14 (describing EPA report comparing penalties
mposed m court and administrative proceedings). In 1992, the median judicial penalty was
nearly 40 times greater than the median administratively imposed penalty. Id.
210. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 21, at 839-40 (observing that environmental
statutes provide citizen plaintiffs financial incentives to bring citizen suits); Austin, supra note
38, at 240 (discussing settlement negotiation of citizen suits). Professors Boyer & Meldinger
noted that many of the early citizen suit cases were settled and the agreed-upon penalties were
paid into "environmental funds" rather than the U.S. Treasury Boyer & Meidinger, supra
note 21, at 932-33; see supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that original purpose
of citizen suits was to encourage agencies to enforce environmental laws).
211. See supra notes 21-46 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history and
purpose of citizen enforcement).
212. See Hodas supra note 109, at 1609 (discussing EPA settlement policy). Professor
Hodas cited a GAO study which demonstrated that EPA often assessed low (or no) penalties
in these settlements. Id. at 1609-10.
213. See Cohen & Haire, supra note 9, at 42-45 (criticizing use of citizen suits). Cohen
and Haire noted the vast difference in policy perspectives between environmental organizations
EPCRA CiTZEN SUITS
deterrent effect of citizen suits is higher than with EPA enforcement because
courts assess higher penalties than the EPA does in settlements. 14
E. Citizen Enforcement Desirable When Government
Fails to Act
Some commentators claim that citizen plaintiffs are fully capable of
taking over enforcement of routine cases." 5 Congress granted citizen
enforcement authority because it recogmzed that occasionally agencies may
choose not to enforce environmental laws." 6 Additionally, one critic sug-
gested that relying on existing institutions for application of environmental
standards and procedures is "to ask too much of institutional self-interest and
good-ol'-boy human nature. ,217 Because engineers tend to move between
government and industry, government engineers may be reluctant to bring
an enforcement action against a possible future employer. Unlike state
administrative agencies, citizens are not subject to the political pressure from
industry and are concerned less with attracting industry to the state.219 Free
and regulated industry. Id. They predicted that the 1996 elections would determine which
side's interpretation would prevail. Id. at 45. With President Clinton retaining the White
House and Republicans retaining control of Congress, it seems that this dispute will continue.
214. See Hodas, supra note 109, at 1613-14 (comparing judicially assessed penalties with
administratively assessed ones). Professor Hodas suggests that, because of the public nature
of court judgments, large judicial penalties have a greater deterrent effect. Id. at 1614. He
states that administrative penalties are "too small and too private to motivate private compli-
ance." Id.
215. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 21, at 836, 963-64 (suggesting that citizen
enforcement can correct agency inaction); Hodas, supra note 109, at 1654 (stating nonmajor
polluters could escape regulation if not for citizen suits).
216. See S. REP No. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970) (citing ineffective government enforce-
ment as one reason Congress created citizen enforcement provisions), reprinted in 1 ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 397, 436-37 (1974); Hodas, supra note 109, at 1651 (describ-
ing citizen suits as enforcement system's safety net).
217 See Hodas, supra note 109, at 1651-55 (describing citizen suits as safety net);
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and
Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV 981, 1007 (1994) (discussing
political effects of agency enforcement).
218. See Hodas, supra note 109, at 1653 (discussing possible conflict of interest between
government engineers and regulated industry). Professor Hodas also suggests that government
and industry engineers share similar professional outlooks which can also blur the line
separating the two sides. Id.
219. See id. at 1615, 1653 (endorsing citizen's role in enforcement). Professor Hodas
notes that some state agencies are reluctant to enforce strictly environmental standards for fear
of creating a bad business climate. Id. at 1615.
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of the bureaucratic and political constraints that inhibit government enforc-
ers,n citizens should be welcome participants m the enforcement of environ-
mental laws.Y
V Returning Citizens to Effective Enforcement Role
The plain language of the EPCRA's citizen suit supports a finding that
Congress intended to authorize citizen suits for historical violations. 222 The
Supreme Court heard arguments on the Citizens for a Better Environment
case m the 1997 term and may resolve the conflict between the courts of
appeals. 223 The Court likely will read the statute narrowly and follow its
analysis m Gwaltney 2 Interpreting the somewhat ambiguous language"
and a possible concern over standing, 226 the Court will probably find that
citizens cannot maintain suits for wholly past violations under EPCRA.
Based on decisions of the Court following Gwaltney, the Supreme Court
continues to be very skeptical of citizen enforcement. In Hallstrom v
Tilamook County,' decided three years after Gwaltney, the Supreme Court
required literal compliance with citizen suit notice and sLxty-day waiting
period requirements.' s The Court effectively transformed the notice and
220. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 21, at 836. Professors Boyer and Meidinger
see citizen suits neither as mere occasional prods that citizens use to goad reluctant agencies
into action, nor as extraordinary remedies for unusual administrative failures. Id. at 836-37
Rather, they see citizen suits as a necessary realignment of roles and powers. Id. at 837
221. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing
Congress's endorsement of citizen participation in environmental enforcement).
222. See supra Part IV (interpreting EPCRA's plain language).
223. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
224. See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text (analyzing Gwaltney decision).
225. See supra Part IV (discussing EPCRA language).
226. See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text (discussing standing for wholly past
violations of environmental statutes).
227 493 U.S. 20 (1989).
228. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 33 (1989) (holding district court must
dismiss citizen suit when party fails to meet notice and 60-day waiting period requirements).
The Court considered whether a citizen plaintiff must strictly comply with the 60-day waiting
period to maintain an action under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).
Id. at 22-23. Hallstrom owned a dairy farm adjacent to the Tillamook County (County)
landfill and notified the County of his intention to sue under RCRA's citizen suit provision.
Id. at 23. Hallstroin failed to notify EPA and state officials in accordance with the citizen suit
provision's requirements. Id. The County moved for summary judgment on grounds that
Hallstrom's failure to follow the requirements deprived the district court of jurisdiction. Id.
at 23-24. The Court determined that the notice requirements are mandatory conditions prece-
dent. Id. at 26. The Court refused to equate a 60-day stay in the proceedings with verbatim
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waiting period, which many lower courts had found subject to waiver and
equitable tolling, into a jurisdictional requirement. " 9 In another case, the
Court limited citizens' right to sue by inposmg strict standing require-
ments. ° The Supreme Court has refused to provide an equitable remedy to
an aggrieved citizen plaintiff because Congress did not include such a
remedy in the elaborate environmental enforcement scheme. 3 As indicated
by these decisions, the Court continues to narrow its view of citizens role in
environmental enforcement. 2
Since Congress enacted EPCRA, the EPA and State governments have
been successful in assembling data regarding the presence of hazardous
chenucals m communities. 3  The public release of this information has
forced business and industry to consider reducing their use of hazardous
materials? 4 As President Clinton explained, "Sharing vital information
compliance with the statute. Id. Citing Gwaltney as authority, the Court noted that one reason
Congress enacted the notice provision was to allow the violator to come into compliance with
the Act during the 60-day waiting period. Id. at 29. The Court held that the notice and 60-
day waiting period are mandatory requirements that district courts cannot ignore. Id. at 33.
229. See AXLINE, supra note 21, § 6.03, at 6-5 to -6 (noting that Supreme Court stopped
short of actually stating requirements are jurisdictional). However, Professor Axline asserts
that strict compliance with the notice provision is a necessary prerequisite of filing a citizen
suit. Id. § 6.03, at 6-6.
230. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(dismissing suit for failure to demonstrate injury-m-fact).
231. Meghng v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996) (allowing dismissal
of citizen suit because plaintiff had already cleaned up pollution). The Court found that the
pollution no longer posed "imminent and substantial endangerment," one requirement for
citizen suit authorization. Id. at 1255.
232. The Supreme Court's recent expansion of a citizen's right to sue under the Endan-
gered Species Act may be an aberration. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1166 (1997)
(expanding "zone of interest" under Endangered Species Act citizen suit provision and
allowing suit by persons other than those suing to protect environment). In Bennett, the
plaintiffs sought to prevent application of environmental restrictions rather than support them.
Id. at 1159. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs lay outside the zone-of-interest of the
Endangered Species Act. Id. at 1160. The Court noted that, although the citizen suit
provision generally favors environmentalists, the citizen suit also provides "persons" the
opportunity to challenge nondiscretionary administrative actions. Id. at 1163. Finding that
the agency failed to consider economic impact of its action, the Court stated that the agency's
action was reviewable under the Endangered Species Act citizen suit provision. Id. at 1166.
Tlus case may not be an expansion of the right to sue under citizen suit provisions, but rather
a recognition that persons, whether seeking to protect the environment or valid business
interests, can seek review of agency action under the citizen suit provision as well as the
Administrative Procedure Act.
233. See Wolf, supra note 3, at 308-10 (discussing successes of EPCRA).
234. Id. at 309-12 (describing efforts by industry to decrease toxic substance releases).
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with the public has provided a strong incentive for reduction in the genera-
tion, and, ultimately, release into the environment, of toxic chemicals."235
However, the EPA has not enforced EPCRA aggressively 236 As budgetary
pressures increase, it is likely that Congress will reduce EPA funding and
federal enforcement will continue to wane. Enhanced citizen suits could be
a cost effective means to fill the growing gap of environmental enforcement.
Allowing citizens to recover the costs incurred in bringing a violator
into compliance, but not allowing recovery of civil penalties, is one compro-
muse solution to the problem with citizen suits and historical violations cured
during the notice period.'3 7 To accomplish this proposed solution, Congress
must modify the citizen suit provision. Using the Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA) as a model, Congress could easily provide citizens a cause of
action to recover litigation expenses. 38 The EAJA requires a court to award
attorney's fees to a "prevailing party" in a civil suit against the government
unless the court finds that the government's position was substantially
justified or if the court determines that special circumstances make the award
unjust. 39 A party does not need to win for the court to deem it a "prevailing
party ,,2" Under EAJA, some courts allow plaintiffs to recover if their
lawsuit was a material factor or played a "catalytic role" in bringing about
a change in the government's position.2u As recogmzed by Congress when
developing the citizen suit, citizens occasionally can play a catalytic role in
enforcement of environmental laws.u 2 Citizens assume this role in enforce-
235. Exec. Order No. 12,969, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,989 (1995).
236. See GAO, REPORT TO CONGRESS, TOXIC CHEMICALS: EPA'S TOXIC RELEASE
INVENTORY IS USEFUL BUT CAN BE IMPROVED (1991) (criticizing EPA for inadequate
enforcement of EPCRA), discussed in Wolf, supra note 3, at 268-76.
237 To encourage violators to file the required forms and reports, Congress should
maintain authorization for citizens to seek civil penalties for violations that exist at the time
the citizen files the complaint.
238. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994).
239. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Kurt M. Dutton, Wilderness Society v. Babbitt:
Court Awards Attorney's Fees to "Prevailing Party" in an Out-of-Court Settlement, 4 U.
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 117, 118 (1994) (discussing EAJA).
240. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Babbitt, 5 F.3d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting plaintiff
need not obtain formal relief on merits for courts to deem plaintiff "prevailing"); Oregon
Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Dutton, supra note
239, at 118 (same).
241. See Wilderness Soc'y, 5 F.3d at 386-89 (allowing plaintiff to recover litigation
expenses m out-of-court settlement); Oregon Envtl. Council, 817 F.2d at 497 (noting that
plaintiff may recover litigation costs if it can establish causal relationship between litigation
and outcome).
242. See S. REP No. 91-1196, at 38 (1970) (discussing reimbursement of litigation
expenses m citizen suits), reprinted in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., LIBRARY OF CON-
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ment of EPCRA if the facility submits reports to EPA after receiving the
citizen's notice of intent to sue.243
This proposal will encourage substantial compliance with EPCRA and
provide citizens with a more effective role m enforcement.'" By amending
either EAJA or environmental citizen suit provisions, Congress could pro-
vide an effective tool in accomplishing widespread compliance with environ-
mental laws. Citizens plaintiffs would get what they seek - compliance with
EPCRA - as well as reimbursement for their expenses incurred in obtaining
compliance. States could not prevent citizens from recovering expenses by
preempting the suit and then passively refuse to enforce the Act; the amend-
ment would allow citizens to recover reasonable expenses incurred up to the
date which states take over enforcement. However, the proposed amend-
ment would curtail citizens' ability to force the regulated industry into
coerced settlement because the statute would no longer authorize citizens to
seek large civil penalties for wholly past violations. The EPA would retain
the authority to seek penalties for purely histoncal violations and thus control
essential policy decisions. Citizens could not interfere with the policy role
of EPA administrators. Additionally, the solution would provide taxpayers
low-cost, effective enforcement and would accomplish EPCRA's goal of
providing communities timely information about the hazardous chemicals
stored and released in their communities.
VT Conclusion
To prepare properly for emergencies, state and local leaders must have
complete and accurate information regarding the hazardous chemicals stored
GRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AiR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 397, 438
(1994). Congress recognized that courts might be reluctant to grant litigation expenses to citi-
zen plaintiffs. The Senate Committee stated that "if as a result of a citizen proceeding and
before a verdict is issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may award litigation expenses
borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting such actions." Id., see supra note 38 and accompanying
text (discussing committee's endorsement of citizen role in environmental enforcement).
243. The proposed solution expands this notion to apply to situations where the violator
comes into compliance before the citizen files suit. It basically extends EAJA to private
defendants of citizen suits. The "catalytic role" line of cases under EAJA allows recovery of
expenses even when the private litigant does not win on the merits. See Wilderness Soc'y, 5
F.3d at 386 (allowing recovery if plaintiff was catalyst m change in government position);
Oregon Envt. Council, 817 F.2d at 497 (explaining plaintiff "need not obtain formal relief"
for EAJA to entitle plaintiff to litigation expenses). The proposed solution creates a rebuttable
presumption that the citizen had a catalytic role on the facility's compliance if the facility files
the required reports after receiving the notice of the citizen's intent to sue.
244. Tis proposal is a wm-wm solution. See STEvEN COVEY, SEvEN HABrrS OF HIGHLY
EarivE PEOPLE 204 (1989) (stating fourth habit of highly effective people is to seek win-
win solution).
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in their communities. When a facility fails to file required reports, emer-
gency personnel may be unaware of the presence of hazardous material and
may respond improperly to emergencies at the facility Congress drafted
EPCRA to prevent this problem. Budgetary and political constraints have
prevented adequate government enforcement of EPCRA.
Congress created citizen suits in response to insufficient state and
federal enforcement. However, environmental organizations have occasion-
ally misused the citizen suit authorization to coerce regulated industry
officials, who fear the dracoman penalties associated with judicial verdicts,
into settlements. Courts have responded to this misuse by reading the citizen
suit provisions narrowly and have severely limited the effectiveness of citi-
zen suits. To restore the original purpose of citizen enforcement, Congress
must step m and amend the current citizen suit provisions and allow citizens
to return to the status of welcome participants in the enforcement of environ-
mental laws.
